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When the Government Is the Controlling 
Shareholder 
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock* 
As a result of the 2008 bailouts, the U.S. government became the 
controlling shareholder of some major U.S. corporations: AIG, Citigroup, 
GM, GMAC, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac.  Corporate law provides a 
complex and comprehensive set of standards of conduct to protect noncon-
trolling shareholders from controlling shareholders who have goals other 
than maximizing firm value.  In this Article, we analyze the extent to which 
these existing corporate law structures of accountability apply when the gov-
ernment is the controlling shareholder and the extent to which federal 
“public law” structures substitute for displaced state “private law” norms.  
We show that the Delaware restrictions on controlling shareholders are 
largely displaced, but hardly replaced, by federal provisions.  Having con-
cluded that the existing accountability structures do not provide sufficient 
protection of minority-shareholder interests, we examine the variety of ways 
(in the United States and elsewhere) in which government ownership has 
been structured in order to minimize political interference at the expense of 
noncontrolling shareholders, including nonvoting stock, independent 
directors, dedicated trusts, and separate management companies.  Because 
neither ex ante legal structures nor ex post judicial review hold much prom-
ise for controlling political interference, we are left with a choice between 
developing new structures of accountability and bringing this anomalous era 
of government control to a speedy conclusion.  As the U.S. Treasury moves 
forward with its plans for taking some of these companies public again, 
understanding the legal restrictions on the government as controlling 
shareholder is critically important to the decision to buy shares in an IPO 
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I. Introduction 
General Motors has returned to the public capital markets with an initial 
public offering of shares.  The U.S. Treasury remains and will remain a con-
trolling shareholder of GM for the foreseeable future.  To what extent will 
Delaware law constrain the federal government in its role as controlling 
shareholder?  Will GM’s minority shareholders be able to sue the U.S. 
Treasury for breach of the duty of loyalty if the Treasury abuses its 
controlling position?  This Article addresses these and related issues. 
Imagine an essay question for next year’s final exam in Corporations: 
  Some background: The Detroit Motor Corporation (DMC or DM) 
is in trouble.  Its cost structure is uncompetitive, the quality of its cars 
is dubious, and, in the midst of a recession, its sales have dropped 
dramatically.  The U.S. government, through the Department of the 
Treasury, is determined to rescue it and prepared to take extraordinary 
steps to do so.  First, the government makes a substantial loan to DM.  
Second, it engineers a reorganization by leaning on the major secured 
creditors—in whom the Treasury happens to own significant stock 
and warrants—to accept less than the unsecured creditors will end up 
receiving.  In the new DM, the Treasury owns 60% of the common 
stock.  Hundreds of dealers are terminated.  Factories are closed.  
Directors and executives are replaced.  Wage rates are frozen.  Around 
the same time, the Treasury rescues the historically related finance 
company, Detroit Motors Acceptance Corporation (DMAC), and ends 
up with a 56% controlling interest in DMAC. 
  Now to the heart of the question: Going forward, the Treasury 
wants new DM to succeed, both because it believes that the United 
States needs to preserve its “domestic” automobile industry (and the 
jobs associated with it) and because, after investing $50 billion, the 
government wants to get the money back.  To further these goals, the 
Treasury leans on DMAC to provide financing (on preferential terms) 
to DM, to customers who buy DM cars, and to the remaining DM 
dealers. 
  At the same time, the Treasury insists on the following: First, it 
wants DM to make DM’s product mix much greener because it 
believes that greener cars are the wave of the future.  Second, it asks 
that no further factories be closed in a set of eight states hit hard by the 




recession and, as it happens, identified by the President’s chief pollster 
as most crucial to the President’s chances of winning a second term. 
  Some of the minority shareholders of DMAC are outraged that 
their company is being run for the benefit of DM.  They provide 
evidence that the preferential terms provided to DM and its dealers 
and customers cost DMAC about $500 million per year.  They would 
like to sue to recover damages already suffered and to prevent these 
preferential contracts from continuing.  Please advise them on what 
claims they can bring, against whom, and how they should proceed.  
Address both substantive and procedural aspects. 
  Some of the minority shareholders of new DM think that going 
green will be financially ruinous.  They would like to take legal action 
to prevent the change or, in the event that it goes forward, wonder if 
they will have any remedy if no one wants to buy new DM’s green 
cars. 
  Finally, minority shareholders of DM complain about the fact that 
factories slated for closing seemed to be picked on some basis other 
than maximizing the corporation’s profits. 
  Please advise them. 
For corporate law, the fact pattern raises several issues.1  First, on 
account of the size of its shareholding, the U.S. government would be 
considered a “controlling shareholder” of both DM and DMAC and, thus, 
would owe fiduciary duties to the respective minority shareholders.  All three 
requests made by the U.S. government—to have DMAC lend money to DM, 
to revise DM’s product mix, and not to have DM close certain factories—
raise fiduciary-duty issues. 
As to DMAC, one worries that the Treasury has used its power over 
DMAC to benefit another firm in the Treasury’s control, DM, at a cost to the 
other shareholders of DMAC.2  In corporate law terms, this raises questions 
of self-dealing and the duty of loyalty.  At the same time, shareholders of 
DM worry that the Treasury is allowing other considerations—reducing 
global warming, saving jobs in recession-battered states, or increasing the 
President’s reelection chances—to lead the Treasury to force DM into costly 
and foolish business decisions that will cost the shareholders huge amounts 
of money.  This raises issues that would normally be analyzed under the duty 
of care and the duty of good faith. 
 
1. It also raises a host of other issues that are beyond the scope of this Article, including the fit 
between Chapter 11’s requirements for the approval of a plan of reorganization and the “363 sale” 
procedure used in the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies, which poses important and unresolved issues 
under bankruptcy law and issues relating to the effect on competitors of the government’s 
investments in DM and DMAC.  See Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler 
Bankruptcy, 108  MICH. L. REV. 727, 734–36, 746–49 (2010). 
2. The background section raises a similar issue with regard to the noncontrolling shareholders 
of the TARP banks.  See infra subpart II(B). 




In posing the corporate law issues, there is an immediate sense that the 
framework does not quite fit the situation.  In the normal self-dealing 
context, the controlling shareholder enriches itself at the expense of the 
noncontrolling shareholders.  Here, by contrast, the Treasury leans on 
DMAC to help DM in order to further certain public-policy initiatives.  
While minority shareholders may well suffer, the Treasury is not lining its 
pocket on their backs.  Although the minority shareholders may object to the 
Treasury furthering public policy at their expense, that is a different 
complaint. 
The United States does not have much history with government 
ownership of private industry.3  As a result, we do not have a well-worked-
out structure of accountability when the government is the majority holder of 
a for-profit corporation.  The problems raised are an interesting inverse of the 
problems caused by privatization of key governmental functions.  When 
prisons, public education, or delivery of social-welfare services are 
privatized, the normal public law structures of accountability may be 
displaced.  For constitutional or administrative law protections to apply, the 
threshold requirement is typically “state action,” a requirement that may not 
be met when services are outsourced to private firms.  The challenge to pub-
lic accountability posed by privatization has produced a large literature that 
examines, in various ways, two main questions: First, is it permissible to out-
source particular functions, as a matter of constitutional norms or public law 
values more generally?  Second, if the delegation is permissible, which of the 
constitutional or administrative law limits, if any, do or should apply to the 
private actor?4  In short, can or should the Constitution or the Administrative 
Procedure Act5 (APA) reach private actors providing public services? 
When the government becomes a controlling shareholder of a private 
firm, we face an inverted set of these issues.  Government involvement, as 
we will see, changes everything.  It immediately raises issues of sovereign 
immunity and its various and sundry waivers.  It forces corporate law 
scholars to venture into the realms of Administrative Law—the content of the 
Tucker Act,6 the Federal Tort Claims Act7 (FTCA), and the APA.  These 
three federal statutes largely displace Delaware’s state law structures of 
accountability.  A key challenge posed by government involvement is 
 
3. For a review of that history, see J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes 
Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 289–93 (2010). 
4. For examples of this literature, see generally Jack Beermann, Privatization and Political 
Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507 (2001); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public 
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003); Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1212 (2003); Paul Verkuil, Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 963 (2005). 
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
6. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491–1503 (2006). 
7. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2006). 




whether the public law approaches to accountability that government in-
volvement imports can, or can be made to, provide the same sort of 
protections that have evolved in private law.  As we will show, the answer, at 
least so far, is largely negative.  The consequence of this is that when the 
government is an investor, ex post judicial review under the heading of 
“fiduciary duties” becomes less effective, and greater attention must be given 
to the ex ante governance structures used when the government takes an eq-
uity position as well as to the potential virtues of precommitment to early 
exit. 
Understanding and evaluating the alternative accountability structures 
available under public and private law is important for a variety of reasons.  
First, we are now in a period of public ownership of controlling positions in 
major private firms, and issues may arise.  Second, in understanding the 
public policy trade-offs involved in decisions to rescue private firms rather 
than allowing them to fail, the extent to which public ownership may lead to 
“noncommercial” behavior of the firm, or politically motivated behavior by 
the controlling shareholder, is a significant factor.  Indeed, the resulting 
structures of accountability must be taken into account in determining how to 
structure the intervention.  Third, understanding the strength or weakness of 
the constraints on the behavior of the controlling shareholder will be impor-
tant to those considering investing in controlled firms as those firms seek to 
raise additional capital or the government seeks to reduce its stake, as in 
GM’s 2010 IPO, and to increase the amount that investors will be willing to 
pay.8  Finally, inadequacies of the public law accountability structures may 
provide reasons to work for an early exit from this hybrid ownership regime.  
If we do not have an adequate regulatory structure when the government is 
the controlling shareholder, we can either develop one or, probably better, 
sell off the government stakes quickly.  Recent developments suggest that the 
government is seeking to exit from its ownership positions just as quickly as 
it can, consistent with getting an adequate price for its shares.9 
In this Article, we examine these issues, the extent to which the existing 
structure of legal regulation addresses them, and the extent to which ex ante 
transactional structures can prevent them from arising or limit their severity 
if they do arise.10  We proceed as follows.  In Part I, we review recent events 
 
8. GM made an initial public offering of new stock in November 2010.  Sharon Terlep, Randall 
Smith & Aaron Lucchetti, GM’s IPO May Raise Record Amount, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704312504575619004098993666.html. 
9. See, e.g., Liz Moyer, Citi Sale Stokes New Trading Dynamic, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703296604576005431476850972.html (discussing 
the Treasury’s sale of its 2.4 billion shares in Citigroup stock and the “expected wave of 
institutional buying” that followed). 
10.  For other work on these issues that overlaps to some degree with our analysis here, see 
Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the 
Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 466 (2009), and Verret, supra note 3, at 285–89. 




during which the U.S. Treasury invested vast sums in private firms, including 
both financial and nonfinancial institutions and both publicly traded and pri-
vately held corporations, as well as some evidence of politically driven 
involvement in the managing of companies.11  In Part II, we examine the 
challenges posed to the existing structure of legal regulation of controlling 
shareholders when the controlling shareholder is the U.S. Treasury.  With 
regard to claims against the United States, this requires looking at sovereign 
immunity and its exceptions, as developed in the FTCA, the Tucker Act, and 
the APA.  We also examine the extent to which one could avoid the reach of 
sovereign immunity by forgoing suit against the controlling shareholder and 
limiting the defendants to the directors of the controlled corporations.  In 
Part III, we turn to the ex ante governance structures that have been used to 
try to control the emergence of these problems.  In this context, we look at a 
variety of U.S. structures, including the previous Chrysler bailout that relied 
on loan guarantees, as well as more recent use of nonvoting stock, share 
trusts, and commitments to exit; the United Kingdom’s establishment of the 
wholly owned U.K. Financial Investments Limited to hold and manage its 
interests in financial institutions bailed out with government funds; and the 
mechanism used by Israel after the bank share trading scandal in the 1980s 
resulted in government ownership of its banks.  Part IV is a conclusion in 
which we try to draw preliminary lessons from our recent experience with 
government ownership and our comparative analyses. 
II. Some Recent Background 
Our starting hypothetical is not simply the product of fevered 
imaginations but is based on recent events.  In this Part, we briefly review 
some of those developments. 
A. The Government’s Holdings in Private Companies: Some Numbers 
Since the summer of 2008, the government has invested huge sums into 
private financial and nonfinancial companies.  These investments have taken 
a variety of forms including debt, nonvoting stock, voting stock, and 
warrants.  Although our focus is on the government as controlling 
shareholder, the threshold of control is vague.  Accordingly, we give a 
broader overview of the government’s recent investments. 
1. Voting Stock and Control Positions. 
 In September 2008, the Treasury invested $85 billion in AIG, in 
partial exchange for which it received preferred stock that has 
77.9% of the votes and warrants that, if exercised, grant it 
 
11. In describing involvement as “politically driven,” we do not intend a value judgment but 
simply to distinguish it from involvement driven by normal financial motives. 




another 2% of the votes.12  If and when the recapitalization 
announced on September 30, 2010, is completed, the Treasury 
will own approximately 92.1% of AIG common stock.13 
 At Citigroup, in the wake of the preferred-stock share exchange, 
the Treasury owned around 34% of the outstanding common 
stock,14 and after Citi’s $17 billion stock issuance, owned 26%.15  
During 2010, the Treasury sold off shares so that, by the end of 
September 2010, its ownership was down to 12.4%.16  The 
Treasury subsequently disposed of its remaining interests.17 
 As a result of the federally engineered bankruptcy, the United 
States owns 8% of the equity in new Chrysler.18 
 As a result of the GM bailout, the Treasury owned 61% of the 
common stock of new GM.19  After GM’s November 2010 IPO, 
the Treasury’s stake dropped to 26%.20 
 The Treasury owns 56% of the common stock of GMAC, GM’s 
former financing affiliate.21 
 The Treasury owns 79.9% of Fannie Mae (FNMA, the Federal 
National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (FHLMC, the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation), the formerly 
 
12. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm.  For further details, see 
infra notes 240–44 and accompanying text. 
13. Pallavi Gogoi & Daniel Wagner, AIG Bailout Exit Doesn’t Resolve Losses from TARP, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 30, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/ 
D9IIHADO0.htm. 
14. Citigroup, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 9 (Nov. 6, 2009). 
15. David Enrich & Damian Paletta, Discord Behind TARP Exits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703323704574602552053952422.html; see also 
Michael Corkery, The Good, Bad, and Ugly of Citigroup’s Botched Stock Sale, WSJ BLOGS (Dec. 
17, 2009), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/12/17/the-good-bad-and-ugly-of-citigroups-botched-
stock-sale/ (“As a result of that capital raise, taxpayers were diluted from a 33% stake in Citigroup 
to 26% . . . .”). 
16. U.S. Treasury to Earn $2.25 Billion on Citi Securities, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN3011328720101001. 
17. Tom Barkley, TARP Profit on Citigroup: $12.3 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703293204576105763449264874.html. 
18. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Obama Administration Auto Restructuring 
Initiative: Chrysler–Fiat Alliance (Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg115.aspx. 
19. See Bill Vlasic & Nick Bunkley, Obama Is Upbeat for G.M. Future on a Day of Pain, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 2, 2009, at A1. 
20. Michael J. de la Merced & Bill Vlasic, U.S. Recovers Billions in Sale of G.M. Stock, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, at A1. 
21. Binyamin Appelbaum, U.S. to Give $3.6 Billion More in Aid to GMAC; Move Makes 
Government the Majority Owner of Troubled Auto Lender, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2009, at A1. 




“private” government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that were 
the largest mortgage intermediaries.22 
2. Debt and Nonvoting Stock. 
 Through its Capital Purchase Program (CPP), the Treasury 
injected approximately $200 billion of Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) funds into 707 institutions.23  The CPP 
investments combine preferred stock with warrants, neither of 
which carries votes. 
 Through the Targeted Investment Program (TIP), the United 
States invested $20 billion in nonvoting preferred stock in Bank 
of America that has now been paid back.24 
And this is but a partial list of the U.S. government’s investments. 
B. Some Troubling Anecdotes 
This much federal money could not be invested in private companies 
without controversy and without inviting politicians to take a role, directly or 
indirectly, in the management of these firms.  Even though governmental in-
vestment started less than three years ago, there are already some troubling 
anecdotes that we summarize in this subpart. 
Executive compensation, traditionally a matter for the board and 
shareholders, has attracted a lot of attention in Washington.  The outcry over 
AIG bonuses provides a rich example.  After receiving more than $170 
billion in bailout funds, AIG announced plans to pay $165 million in bonuses 
to executives in the company’s financial products division, the same division 
responsible for the collapse of AIG.25  In response, Representative Earl 
Pomeroy proclaimed, “Have the recipients of these checks no shame at 
all? . . .  [AIG bonus recipients] are disgraced professional losers.  And by 
the way, give us our money back.”26  Others, such as Representative Charles 
Rangel, characterized AIG as “getting away with murder,”27 while 
Republican Senator Charles Grassley advised AIG bonus recipients to 
 
22. Louise Story, New Aid for Fannie and Freddie, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at B1. 
23. Investment Programs: Capital Purchase Program, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www. 
treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/investment-programs/cpp/Pages/capitalpurchaseprogram. 
aspx. 
24. Investment Programs: Targeted Investment Program, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www. 
treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/investment-programs/tip/Pages/targetedinvestmentprog 
ram.aspx; see also Securities Purchase Agreement Between Bank of America Corp. and U.S. Dep’t 
of the Treasury (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/investment-programs/tip/Documents_Contracts_Agreements/BAC%20III%20Binder.pdf. 
25. Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, At A.I.G., Huge Bonuses After $170 Billion Bailout, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A1. 
26. Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, A.I.G. and Wall St. Confront Upsurge of Populist 
Fury, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at A1. 
27. Id. 




“[r]esign or go commit suicide.”28  President Obama, in a more measured 
response intended to “channel [public] anger in a constructive way,”29 urged 
Congress to draft legislation that sends “a strong signal to the executives who 
run these firms that such compensation will not be tolerated.”30 
But, aside from these predictable and traditional responses to perceived 
corporate excess, there are a number of more interesting details that illustrate 
the new dynamics made possible by government ownership.  Representative 
Barney Frank, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, pushed 
the idea of suing AIG to get the bonus money back, pointing out that the fed-
eral government owns nearly an 80% stake in the company after giving it 
more than $170 billion in aid.31  “I still believe that we have a right legally to 
recover this, because we can assert our ownership rights and say, yes, you 
may have had a contractual right to a bonus but your rotten performance 
means you should forfeit it,” he was quoted as saying.32 
Frank’s notion that the government may have more power—or, at least, 
different power—as shareholder than as regulator has been picked up by 
shareholder activists.  At AIG, where a Treasury trust holds 77.9% of the 
stock, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME) lobbied the three trustees to withhold the trust’s votes from the 
AIG director who served on the compensation committee during the period 
in which the bonuses were granted, to vote against AIG’s 2008 compensation 
in the advisory shareholder vote required of TARP participants, and to sup-
port AFSCME’s shareholder proposal requiring that executive equity awards 
be held for two years past departure.33 
But the attempts to influence portfolio companies have been broader.  
Congress expected that bailout funds would stimulate lending and revitalize 
 
28. AIG and the President: Easy Does It, ECONOMIST, Mar. 21, 2009, http://www.economist. 
com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13326168. 
29. Jackie Calmes & Louise Story, A.I.G. Seeking Return of Half of Its Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 19, 2009, at A1. 
30. Hulse & Herszenhorn, supra note 26; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin et al., U.S. Rounding 
Up Investors to Buy Bad Bank Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2009, at A1 (reporting the Obama 
Administration’s intent to increase oversight of executive compensation at financial institutions).  
On the legislative side, Congress soon responded to the President’s challenge.  The House of 
Representatives passed a bill that retroactively imposed a 90% tax on bonuses paid after January 1, 
2009, for traders and executives earning in excess of $250,000 a year.  The bill applied to 
companies retaining $5 billion or more in bailout funds.  Representative David Camp said of the 
legislation, “It is an extreme use of the tax code to correct an extreme and excessive wrong done to 
the American taxpayer.”  Hulse & Herszenhorn, supra note 26. 
31. Foon Rhee, Liddy: Some “Distasteful” Bonuses Will Be Returned, BOSTON.COM (Mar. 18, 
2009), http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2009/03/frank_not_optim.html. 
32. Id. 
33. Letter from Gerald W. McEntee, President, AFSCME, Denise L. Nappier, Treasurer, State 
of Conn. & Richard L. Trumka, Sec’y Treasurer, AFL-CIO, to Jill M. Considine, Chester B. 
Feldberg & Douglas L. Foshee, Majority S’holders, AIG (Mar. 31, 2009), available at 
http://www.afscme.org/docs/AIG_Trustee_Letter_3.31_re_Vote_No.pdf. 




the economy but later realized that banks were reluctant to lend for fear of 
continued economic deterioration.  As a result, bailout recipients faced 
mounting pressure from the President and Congress to increase lending.  
President Obama said he would “hold banks ‘fully accountable’ for the as-
sistance they receive, and that they ‘will have to clearly demonstrate how 
taxpayer dollars result in more lending for the American taxpayer.’”34  
Senators lashed out at banking executives appearing before the Senate 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee for using bailout funds for 
anything other than increasing lending.35  At a separate hearing before the 
House Financial Services Committee, Representative Judy Biggert ques-
tioned whether “the funds [had] been used to get credit flowing again, not 
just to financial institutions but to consumers and small businesses.”36  Other 
committee members “sought promises from the bank executives that they 
would use the government funds they received to make loans and stimulate 
the economy, rather than hold onto it to bolster their balance sheets.”  
Representative Michael Capuano implored executives to “get our money out 
on the street.”37 
Similar calls from Congress soon followed for banks to stem 
foreclosures and restrain action against struggling homeowners.  Barney 
Frank “acknowledged that struggling homeowners [were not] getting help as 
fast as many in Congress had hoped”38 and urged bank executives to put in 
place a foreclosure moratorium until the government could implement miti-
gation programs.39  Frank also criticized hedge fund managers for reportedly 
directing mortgage servicers to disregard any government program that un-
dercut investment value.40  Senator Charles Schumer told regulators that 
“they seemed to be giving the banks ‘a little too much dessert and not 
making them eat their vegetables,’” because banks had not been required to 
assist homeowners despite receiving bailout funds.41  In response, many big 
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banks put into operation temporary foreclosure moratoriums in advance of 
the Obama Administration’s housing-rescue-plan announcement.42 
One adaptation to this intense scrutiny has been to preclear any 
potentially controversial decision with the Treasury or the White House.  It 
was reported, for example, that in the wake of the firestorm of criticism of 
the AIG bonuses, “senior Treasury officials have been meeting several times 
a week all spring to review, one by one, the payments to the company’s 
executives.  But the time-consuming discussions have never resolved 
whether any of the executives should get paid.”43  This led to preclearance of 
even routine bonuses by Kenneth Feinberg, the “compensation czar.”44 
The Treasury ousted Rick Wagoner as GM’s CEO on March 29, 2009.  
He remained an employee of GM until July 14 because it took that long for 
the Treasury to decide whether he should receive the severance package that 
the company had promised him.45 
The GM and Chrysler bailouts have brought an avalanche of political 
attention.  The Senate has held hearings on GM’s and Chrysler’s plans to re-
duce their networks of dealerships.  As the Washington Post summarized, 
“Empowered by the government’s emerging ownership role, members of a 
Senate committee yesterday excoriated General Motors and Chrysler for their 
decisions last month to close more than 2,000 dealers.”46  Senator Mark 
Warner, although acknowledging the dangers of trying to micromanage 
government-owned companies, nonetheless said that “we’ve got the right and 
responsibility to ask these questions.”47  GM and Chrysler also have facilities 
in many different congressional districts.  As the Washington Post reported, 
“Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.) said GM management had agreed to postpone 
a planned shutdown of a parts distribution center in Norton, Mass., after a 
meeting he had with its chief executive, Fritz Henderson.”48  The political 
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involvement continues to intensify.49  Indeed, in May 2010, GM announced 
plans to reinstate half of the dealers who challenged GM’s terminations.50 
But it is worth keeping in mind that the government can give as well as 
take.  In a little-noticed ruling at the time of the GM Section 363 sale, the 
IRS decided, contrary to general practice, that old GM’s “net operating loss” 
tax-carry-forwards would pass to new GM.51  The effect of this ruling is that 
the first $45.4 billion of new GM’s profits will be tax free. 
More recently, the political dance has become even more complex.  
After a pause during its expedited bankruptcy, government-controlled GM 
has resumed its lobbying and campaign contributions.  Federal Election 
Commission records indicate that GM contributed $90,500 to lawmakers 
during the current election cycle.52  It has also rebuilt its lobbying force, 
spending $6.9 million in the year following its exit from bankruptcy.53 
At Citigroup, the ongoing instability in the top management has been 
attributed to conflicts with federal regulators: 
Mr. Pandit made the changes under pressure from federal regulators 
and after discussions with Citigroup Chairman Richard Parsons, who 
has been trying to defuse a standoff between the company and some 
top federal officials, people familiar with the situation say.  The 
federal government will soon own as much as 34% of Citigroup’s 
shares.54 
More recently, Citigroup sold its profitable PhiBro subsidiary at a 
bargain price to avoid a conflict with the Treasury over $100 million in 
compensation owed to Andrew Sullivan.55 
The Treasury’s political considerations have led it to block profitable 
actions by controlled firms.  For example, at Fannie Mae, the Treasury ve-
toed a sale of $3 billion in tax credits to Goldman Sachs and Berkshire 
Hathaway.  Although these tax credits were worthless to Fannie Mae, the 
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Treasury would have lost tax revenues had they been sold to an entity that 
could use the credits to offset its taxes.  In this way, the financial interests of 
the Treasury and of Fannie Mae and its (nongovernmental) shareholders and 
creditors were in clear conflict—and the Treasury’s interests prevailed.56 
These anecdotes raise a variety of concerns, two of which we will focus 
on.57  First, one worries that the influence or control that comes with a major 
investment (debt or equity) will be used to achieve goals other than max-
imizing the value of the firm or ensuring that the debt is repaid.  With the 
polycentric power structure of the federal government, the potential exists for 
congressional pressure to be brought to bear on firms to adopt policies fa-
vored by politicians without regard to whether those policies advance the 
interests of the firm.  The automobile-dealership hearings provide a concrete 
example: the political pressure could surely convince GM and Chrysler to 
preserve some politically well-connected dealerships that they otherwise 
would close. 
The second concern is that the resulting governance structure will be 
dysfunctional.  This may be caused by managers’ attempts to be responsive 
to too many different sources of pressure.  With pressures from chairs of 
congressional committees, the White House, and the Treasury, steering the 
ship forward becomes even more complicated.  Additionally, as noted above, 
to the extent that, for example, the Treasury expects to sign off on significant 
business decisions and does not have the staff or expertise in place to provide 
this input in a timely or competent manner, the quality of the decisions may 
be compromised. 
We close this subpart with GM’s straightforward articulation of the 
potential conflicts of interest: 
The UST (or its designee) will continue to own a substantial interest in 
us following this offering, and its interests may differ from those of our 
other stockholders. 
  Immediately following this offering, the UST will own 
approximately 36.9% of our outstanding shares of common stock 
(33.3% if the underwriters in the offering of common stock exercise 
their over-allotment option in full).  As a result of this stock ownership 
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interest, the UST has the ability to exert control, through its power to 
vote for the election of our directors, over various matters.  To the 
extent the UST elects to exert such control over us, its interests (as a 
government entity) may differ from those of our other stockholders and 
it may influence, through its ability to vote for the election of our 
directors, matters including: 
• The selection, tenure and compensation of our management; 
• Our business strategy and product offerings; 
• Our relationship with our employees, unions and other 
constituencies; and 
• Our financing activities, including the issuance of debt and equity 
securities. 
  In particular, the UST may have a greater interest in promoting U.S. 
economic growth and jobs than other stockholders of the Company.  For 
example, while we have repaid in full our indebtedness under the UST 
Credit Agreement, a covenant that continues to apply until the earlier of 
December 31, 2014 or the UST has been paid in full the total amount of 
all UST invested capital requires that we use our commercially 
reasonable best efforts to ensure, subject to exceptions, that our 
manufacturing volume in the United States is consistent with specified 
benchmarks. 
  In the future we may also become subject to new and additional laws 
and government regulations regarding various aspects of our business as 
a result of participation in the TARP program and the U.S. 
government’s ownership in our business.  These regulations could make 
it more difficult for us to compete with other companies that are not 
subject to similar regulations.58 
C. How Did We Get Here? 
Government ownership, a product of a fast-moving and fast-changing 
crisis, is widespread and extremely complicated.  Money has been invested 
through a variety of programs with a variety of restrictions and a variety of 
goals.  As a result, the terms of the government’s ownership positions vary 
widely among portfolio companies.  To describe the broad patterns of 
ownership, we briefly review the chronology and the relevant legislation. 
Beginning in the summer of 2007, troubles in the subprime-mortgage 
sector undermined confidence not just in the asset-backed securities that 
contained those mortgages but more generally in the credibility of funda-
mental legal and market structures: the accuracy of the credit ratings, the 
solvency of the monoline insurers, and the safety and soundness of key fi-
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nancial institutions.  As confidence in market institutions collapsed, and with 
it confidence in the soundness of counterparties, the credit markets froze. 
In response, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve intervened in a 
variety of ways.  In the first stage of intervention, they sought to unfreeze the 
credit markets by providing additional liquidity.  In August 2007, the Federal 
Reserve, along with the European Central Bank, injected $100 billion for 
borrowing;59 in November 2007, it injected another $41 billion;60 in the 
Spring of 2008, it cut interest rates61 and opened the discount window to in-
vestment banks.62 
Second, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve intervened in an ad hoc 
way to try to prevent failures of systemically important financial institutions.  
Thus, in March 2008, the Federal Reserve provided financial assistance to 
J.P. Morgan Chase in the rescue of Bear Stearns.63  Also during March, the 
Federal Reserve announced measures to provide liquidity to commercial and 
investment banks.  Later, during the summer of 2008, the Treasury acted to 
shore up the capital structures of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and ultimately 
put both into conservatorship.64 
These interventions were controversial.  Some argued that the 
government had no business intervening to save firms and that doing so 
created moral hazard.65  Others argued that the interventions were indefensi-
ble handouts to the rich and powerful.66 
Then came the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, and 
the ensuing panic. 
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On September 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve saved AIG by pledging 
$85 billion in exchange, inter alia, for a promise to issue preferred stock with 
79.9% of the voting rights.67  Subsequent amounts were ultimately pledged 
and invested in AIG. 
On October 3, 2008, on its second try, Congress enacted the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 200868 (EESA), which gave birth to the TARP 
program.  This set the framework for most of the subsequent investments in 
firms.  Within the TARP framework, a variety of programs were launched 
including the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), used to invest in banks; the 
Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program (SSFIP), used for sub-
sequent investments in AIG; the Targeted Investment Program (TIP), used 
for Citigroup and Bank of America; and the Term Asset-Backed Lending 
Facility (TALF). 
To understand the terms of the government’s portfolio, we need to 
review briefly the key provisions of the EESA.  In doing so, it is critical to 
keep in mind that when enacted, the stated rationale was that TARP funds 
would be used to purchase toxic assets from troubled financial institutions.  
But TARP later morphed into a program to invest directly in troubled finan-
cial institutions, a direction that was already contemplated even before the 
EESA was enacted but not disclosed to Congress.69  It is also critical to recall 
how difficult it was to pass the EESA and the political obstacles to returning 
to Congress for additional authority or funding. 
With this as background, we turn to the statutory structure.  In keeping 
with the original conception, the EESA authorized the Treasury to buy 
“troubled assets” from “financial institutions.”70  The Treasury was given 
additional discretion through the broad definition of troubled assets, which 
potentially included any mortgage or related security as well as any other 
financial instrument so designated by the Treasury Secretary.71  Finally, in 
order to allow taxpayers to benefit from the upside of these purchases, 
§ 113(d) required that when the Treasury purchased troubled assets from a 
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financial institution, the Treasury must also receive a warrant.72  Under the 
terms of § 113(d), the warrant must be for nonvoting shares or, if no 
nonvoting shares are provided for in the certificate of incorporation, the 
Treasury must agree not to vote the warrant shares. 
As noted above, the bailout strategy shifted decisively away from the 
purchase of troubled assets to investment in troubled firms.  Because the def-
inition of troubled asset noted above is very broad73 and the prohibition on 
acquiring voting stock only applied to warrant shares and not to the troubled 
assets themselves,74 the Treasury had clear authority to buy voting common 
stock in financial institutions. 
This authority was exercised in various ways.  In the CPP, which 
channeled funds to banks, the Treasury chose to acquire nonvoting preferred 
stock.  The Treasury’s standard term sheet, developed by private equity law-
yers at Simpson Thacher,75 provided that the senior preferred stock would be 
nonvoting except for class voting rights on the issuance of more senior 
securities, on changes to the rights of the senior preferred stock, or on any 
merger or other transaction that would adversely affect the rights of the se-
nior preferred stock.76  As described above, in TARP investments pursuant to 
other programs, the Treasury has sometimes taken voting stock.77  Finally, 
there are situations in which the Treasury has switched from nonvoting to 
voting stock.78  This has led to a somewhat varied set of terms within the 
government’s portfolio. 
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The government then used TARP to bail out the automobile industry.  
In December 2008, pursuant to the CPP, the Treasury invested $5 billion in 
GMAC (which had become a bank holding company in order to qualify for 
the CPP) in exchange for preferred stock and warrants that did not carry 
voting rights.79  The Treasury subsequently created the Automotive Industry 
Financing Program (AIFP).  In May 2009, through the AIFP, the Treasury 
invested an additional $7.5 billion in GMAC.80  As of June 2009, the 
Treasury held 35% of GMAC’s equity with the ability to increase that stake 
to more than 50% through the exercise of warrants.81  At the end of 2009, the 
Treasury invested an additional $3.8 billion, increasing its total investment to 
$16.3 billion and increasing its stock ownership to 56%.82 
As GMAC became a bank holding company before receiving any TARP 
funds, the investments fit comfortably within the statutory authority.  The use 
of TARP funds under the AIFP to invest in GM and Chrysler sits on a less 
secure statutory foundation.  Although, as noted above, the statutory defini-
tion of troubled asset is sufficiently broad to include common or preferred 
stock, the statutory definition of “financial institution” is more problematic.  
In order to have authority to receive TARP funds, it must be the case that 
GM and Chrysler are, under the statute, financial institutions.  The EESA’s 
definition of a financial institution provides in relevant part, 
The term “financial institution” means any institution, including, but 
not limited to, any bank, savings association, credit union, security 
broker or dealer, or insurance company, established and regulated 
under the laws of the United States or any State . . . and having 
significant operations in the United States, but excluding any central 
bank of, or institution owned by, a foreign government.83 
For GM and Chrysler to fit this definition, one must read the phrase 
“any institution, including, but not limited to” to sweep in institutions that are 
not financial institutions under any normal understanding of the term.  As a 
matter of statutory interpretation, that argument hardly passes the smell test.  
As a matter of politics, the Treasury had little choice: Congress had already 
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rejected a request to authorize funds to bail out the auto industry84 and had 
only passed the EESA on its second try.  But however thin the basis under 
the EESA, it did not help the secured bondholders who objected in the 
Chrysler bankruptcy; they found out that they did not have standing to make 
the argument.85 
Through its TARP investments, the Treasury currently has an 8% voting 
stake in new Chrysler86 and a 26% voting stake in new GM.87 
In this fluid situation, the size and nature of the government’s interest 
can change.  In the fourth quarter of 2008, the Treasury invested $45 billion 
in Citigroup in exchange for nonvoting perpetual preferred stock and 
warrants convertible into 6.2% of Citigroup’s voting stock.88  The exercise 
price of the warrants is well above current stock price, and none have so far 
been exercised.89  On February 27, 2009, in order to increase its “core” Tier 1 
capital, Citigroup announced plans for an exchange offer to exchange 
preferred stock for common stock.  As part of this exchange offer, the 
Treasury agreed to exchange up to $25 billion of its preferred stock for 
common stock on a dollar-for-dollar basis with other holders of preferred 
stock.90  After the completion of the exchange offer, the Treasury owned ap-
proximately 34% of Citigroup’s outstanding common stock, not including 
the exercise of warrants issued as part of the TARP investment.91  This, of 
course, can change: Citigroup recently raised $17 billion in new common 
equity while the Treasury was unsuccessful in selling its stake, leaving the 
Treasury’s stake, after the dilution from the new stock issuance, at 26%.92  In 
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85. See In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 79, 83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he Court finds that 
the Indiana Funds do not have standing under EESA to challenge the actions of the U.S. Treasury 
pursuant to TARP.”). 
86. Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Operating Agreement of Chrysler 
Group LLC (June 10, 2009) (Schedule of Members), available at http://www.treasury. 
gov/initiatives/financial-stability/investment-programs/aifp/Documents_Contracts_Agreements/ 
Chrysler%20LLC%20Corporate%20as%20of%2012-01-10.pdf; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of the Treasury, supra note 18 (referencing the Treasury’s plan to receive 8% of the equity of 
Chrysler). 
87. Merced & Vlasic, supra note 20. 
88. Citigroup, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6, 9, 44 (Feb. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Annual 
Report]; see also Citigroup, Inc., Proxy Statement 1, 19 (Mar. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Proxy 
Statement]. 
89. Proxy Statement, supra note 88, at 1. 
90. Citigroup, Inc., Exchange Offer (Form S-4), at 37 amend. 4 (June 18, 2009); see also 
Annual Report, supra note 88, at 45. 
91. Citigroup, Inc., supra note 14, at 9. 
92. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 




further sales during 2010, the Treasury disposed of the remainder of its 
stake.93 
D. Purpose Versus Effect of Acquiring Stock Position 
So, through a variety of routes, the Treasury has ended up with equity 
investments in private firms.  These range from relatively small nonvoting 
positions to controlling stakes. 
There is no evidence that the government took these positions in order 
to gain control.  First, as noted above, the original expectation was that the 
Treasury would be acquiring troubled assets, not equity stakes.  The language 
of the EESA, as well as its legislative history, make clear that the Treasury 
took warrants in order to be able to profit from any increases in share value.  
The cleanest and easiest way for the taxpayers to share in the upside of these 
investments, without exercising control, was through warrants for nonvoting 
stock. 
Moreover, as the sole available lender and as the regulator of many of 
these entities, the government already had significant power.  In the short 
term, voting rights may not have added much.  As the largest, and probably 
only, willing lender and with the normal covenants (no dividends, veto over 
acts or transactions that could impair the value of the nonvoting preferred 
stock, etc.), the Treasury already had significant control. 
But, although only the looniest bloggers would claim that this was all a 
plot to foist socialism on America,94 the result of these various initiatives has 
been, as noted above, that the Treasury now has significant ownership stakes 
in a variety of firms.  And with control comes the temptation and opportunity 
to interfere.  As the earlier illustrations show, once the Treasury owns large 
or controlling equity stakes in firms, there is a temptation to use those stakes 
as instruments of control.  If Barney Frank can prevent GM from closing a 
parts distribution facility in his district, he will save the jobs of his 
constituents, and this may be worthwhile even if it interferes with GM’s 
plans to trim costs.  While the incentive to interfere is obvious, the structure 
of this temptation has several features. 
First, an equity position, especially a control block, can provide the 
power to interfere.  Indeed, because there are so many different means by 
which a controlling shareholder can exercise control, it rarely must do so.  
Usually, it is enough for the control shareholder simply to indicate its 
 
93. Randall Smith, Aaron Lucchetti & Michael R. Crittenden, U.S. Unloads Citi Stake for a $12 
Billion Profit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487041563 
04576003884177348202.html. 
94. See, e.g., Georg Thomas, GM Symbol of USA: Obama’s Vulture Socialism, 
REDSTATEECLECTIC (June 4, 2009), http://redstateeclectic.typepad.com/redstate_commentary/ 
2009/06/gm-symbol-of-usa-obamas-vulture-socialism.html (“Obama is the figurehead of the 
accelerating takeover of the United States by vulture socialists.”). 




preference and the managers will acquiesce.  Real power need never be 
overtly exercised.  Although it may be that the federal government has suffi-
cient regulatory power to intervene across the full range of issues, a control 
block provides a different kind of power: a power that, depending on how it 
is structured, can be exercised more informally and with more discretion, 
outside of the formal regulatory process and the accompanying public 
scrutiny, and more directly by politicians rather than by appointed 
bureaucrats. 
Second, stock ownership provides periodic opportunities to interfere.  
Every year, shareholders elect directors and vote on shareholder proposals, 
compensation plans, auditors, etc.  A controlling shareholder’s vote will typi-
cally be decisive.95  As a result, once one has control, one has virtually no 
choice but to decide critical issues.  At AIG, where a trust holds the 
Treasury’s 77.9% stake, the AIG trustees simply cannot avoid deciding who 
will be the directors.  If they do not attend the meeting, in person or by 
proxy, no actions can be taken for lack of a quorum.  If they do attend, their 
vote is decisive.  When AFSCME submits a shareholder proposal at AIG, the 
AIG trustees’ decision on how to vote the Treasury’s shares will determine 
whether the proposal is approved or rejected. 
Finally, an existing stock position minimizes the political cost of 
interference.  To be sure, in times of crisis—like the last three years—the 
government as regulator and lender of last resort has ample power over com-
panies to have its way without any stock ownership at all.  The Obama 
Administration could get rid of GM CEO Rick Wagoner by a mere 
suggestion, even without any stock ownership.  The White House and the 
Treasury surely had the power to force Bank of America’s CEO Ken Lewis 
to step down, even without stock ownership.96  But this power dissipates 
quickly.  In ordinary times, firms will have allegiances with congressional 
forces, and the political cost of executive interference with internal firm deci-
sions will be high.  When, for example, in the wake of Enron and accounting 
scandals, a Republican administration sought to rein in Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, their strong Congressional support protected them from 
interference.  The power and periodic opportunities provided by stock 
ownership will change the cost of interference during ordinary times, even if 
it will not eliminate those costs. 
 
95. Unless one has precommitted to mirror voting, as for example, the Treasury did at Citigroup 
over certain matters.  See infra note 259 and accompanying text. 
96. See Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn Into a Federal 
Bailout?  Part III: Joint Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform and the 
Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 24–25 
(2009) (statement of Henry M. Paulson, Secretary of the Treasury) (detailing the process by which 
Bank of America’s management could be removed and acknowledging that Paulson threatened 
removal); Dan Fitzpatrick, U.S. Regulators to B of A: Obey or Else, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124771415436449393.html#mod=testMod (discussing the influence 
that the government exerted upon Bank of America). 




III. When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder: Regulation 
A. The Baseline: The Problems Posed by Ordinary Controlling 
Shareholders 
Delaware corporate law has long been suspicious of controlling 
shareholders.  Under Delaware law, a shareholder is “controlling” if either 
the shareholder controls a majority of the votes in a corporation or if the 
shareholder controls less than a majority but there is evidence that the 
shareholder exercises control over the board (if, for example, the directors 
defer to the views of the shareholder).97 
If a shareholder is viewed as controlling, there are two consequences.  
First, that shareholder is deemed to owe fiduciary duties to the remaining 
“minority” or “noncontrolling” shareholders.98  These duties extend to the 
shareholder’s action in influencing board or management decisions99 but not 
to its actions in voting its shares.100 
Second, special rules apply to the legal standard for alleged breaches of 
fiduciary duties—at least some breaches.  Transactions that do not enjoy the 
protection of the business-judgment rule—because they entail self-dealing, 
involve other material conflicts of interest, or were arrived at in a grossly 
negligent matter—are evaluated under the entire-fairness standard with the 
burden of proving entire fairness on the defendant directors (or the defendant 
controlling shareholder).101  But generally, if, after full disclosure, these 
transactions are approved by a majority of disinterested and independent 
directors or disinterested shareholders, the business-judgment rule is 
 
97. RODMAN WARD, JR. ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 
§ 151.5.1 (5th ed. 2006) (citing In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 634 A.2d 319, 328 (Del. 1993), and 
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987)); see also Emerald 
Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 94 (Del. 2001) (“‘[A] shareholder who owns less than 50% of a 
corporation’s outstanding stock, without some additional allegation of domination through actual 
control of corporat[e] conduct, is not a “controlling stockholder.”’” (quoting Emerald Partners v. 
Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1221 n.8 (Del. 1999))); Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 
1114 (Del. 1994) (holding that Alcatel was a controlling shareholder because it held a 43.3% stake 
in Lynch and controlled Lynch’s business affairs); In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 
551–53 (Del. Ch. 2003) (holding that Cysive’s CEO, though a minority shareholder, was 
nevertheless the controlling shareholder because he was the founder, CEO, had family members in 
executive positions, and controlled enough shares to cast the decisive vote in any contested matter). 
98. WARD ET AL., supra note 97, at § 151.5.1. 
99. Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1344. 
100. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 240, at 653 (3d 
ed. 1983) (clarifying that shareholders can vote as they desire because their shares are their private 
property). 
101. For a discussion of the shifting burden of persuasion under the entire-fairness standard, see 
Bud Roth, Entire Fairness Review for a “Pure” Breach of the Duty of Care: Sensible Approach or 
Technicolor Flop?, 15 DEL. L. REV. 145, 165–67 (2000).  See also Cathy L. Reese & Kelly A. 
Herring, Recent Developments in Delaware Corporate Law, 7 DEL. L. REV. 177, 192, 197 (2004) 
(summarizing cases where the entire-fairness burden was at issue). 




reinstated, and the transaction must pass only the (lenient) standard of 
waste.102  Such approvals are also referred to as “cleansing acts.”103 
However, if the transaction involves a controlling shareholder, the rules 
on cleansing acts are different.  First, as to approval by disinterested 
directors, the court mandates stricter conduct before their approval “counts.”  
In particular, it is not sufficient that these directors are technically 
disinterested and independent; they must also devote substantial care to 
evaluating the transaction, must have the power to say no, and must employ 
appropriate processes (including, when warranted, the hiring of independent 
legal and business advisors).  Second, as to the effect of the cleansing act (if 
the approval counts), it does not reinstate the business-judgment rule but 
merely shifts the burden of proving entire fairness to the plaintiffs (who have 
to prove that the transaction was not entirely fair).104 
The reason for the skepticism about approval by independent directors 
is reasonably clear.  After all, a majority shareholder controls the board com-
position and thus effectively appoints the directors and can remove them at 
any time, and the directors know it.  Even nonmajority controlling sharehold-
ers have substantial influence over board composition.  Directors have 
sometimes shown excessive deference to controlling shareholders, leading to 
some skepticism on just how independent the directors can or will be.105  In 
the Delaware case law, controlling shareholders have been likened to “800-
pound gorilla[s]” who are so intimidating that they always get their way.106 
 
102. WARD ET AL., supra note 97, § 151.5.4 (citing Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 235–36 
(Del. Ch. 1990)). 
103. See David B. Feirstein, Note, Parents and Subsidiaries in Delaware: A Dysfunctional 
Standard, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 479, 488 (2006) (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 
703 (Del. 1983)) (“[T]he court noted that an informed vote of a majority of disinterested 
shareholders (a ‘Cleansing Act’) could serve to shift this burden of proving entire fairness (or the 
lack thereof) to the plaintiff . . . .”). 
104. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (holding 
that approval by disinterested directors shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff but does not change 
the entire-fairness standard).  There is some ambiguity in the Delaware case law.  Compare Kahn v. 
Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (stating, in the context of a self-dealing transaction 
involving the controlling shareholder, that approval by a properly functioning committee of 
independent directors would shift the burden of the entire-fairness standard to plaintiffs), with 
Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 20 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2002) (stating, in the context of a merger 
involving a material conflict of interest on the part of the controlling shareholder, that entire fairness 
applies ab initio to “a squeeze out merger or a merger between two companies under the control of a 
controlling shareholder”).  Orman v. Cullman thus raises the possibility that entire fairness does not 
apply to all transactions involving controlling shareholders but only to a subset. 
105. See, e.g., In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 
1305745, at *33–35 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (describing shareholders’ contentions that the board 
was unfairly beholden to the controlling shareholder in approving an unfair privatization). 
106. See In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 436 (Del. Ch. 2002).  In the words 
of one court, 
The Supreme Court [in Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc.] concluded that 
even a gauntlet of protective barriers like those would be insufficient protection 
because of (what I will term) the “inherent coercion” that exists when a controlling 




As to the approval by disinterested shareholders, the stated reason for 
the skepticism is that shareholders may be afraid of retaliation by the con-
trolling shareholder if they fail to grant their approval.  A second, unstated 
reason is that shareholders, without the benefit of the advice of trusted inde-
pendent directors and subject to shareholders’ own collective-action 
problems, may make too many mistakes in their approval to justify restoring 
business-judgment review. 
B. The Problem of the Government as a Controlling Shareholder 
Whatever the poundage of a regular, private controlling shareholder, the 
problems created—and the weight of the corresponding gorilla—are 
potentially magnified when the controlling shareholder is the U.S. 
government.  First, for many of the companies in which the U.S. government 
has obtained a controlling stake, the influence of the government extends 
beyond its influence as a large shareholder.  For banks and other financial 
companies, the government also acts as the principal regulator.107  In compa-
nies such as AIG, GMAC, and Citigroup, the government also has a 
significant stake as a creditor and may be the sole source of additional 
capital.  And for any company, regardless of industry, the potential exists that 
the government will pass new types of regulation.  This potential is not far-
fetched.  Companies that were recipients of federal TARP funds—several of 
which were pushed by the government to take these funds—found them-
selves subject to a new law, not applicable to other companies, that forced 
them to either limit the amount of executive compensation or submit their 
compensation to an advisory shareholder vote.  Because the government 
holds so many levers—as large shareholders, as present and potential future 
regulator, and sometimes as lender and creditor—it is potentially a much 
bigger gorilla than a regular, private controlling shareholder. 
Second, conflicts between the controlling shareholder and the minority 
shareholders are much harder to monitor when the controlling shareholder is 
 
stockholder announces its desire to buy the minority’s shares.  In colloquial terms, the 
Supreme Court saw the controlling stockholder as the 800-pound gorilla whose urgent 
hunger for the rest of the bananas is likely to frighten less powerful primates like 
putatively independent directors who might well have been hand-picked by the gorilla 
(and who at the very least owed their seats on the board to his support). 
Id. 
107. On the influence this can give, see, for example, SORKIN, supra note 69, at 524–25.  In a 
meeting with major bank CEOs, Treasury Secretary Paulson insisted that the banks accept TARP 
money, whether they wanted it or not.  When Richard Kovacevich, CEO of Wells Fargo, resisted, 
Sorkin reports, 
Paulson told him, “Your regulator is sitting right there.”  John Dugan, comptroller of 
the currency, and FDIC chairwoman Sheila Bair were directly across the table from 
him.  “And you’re going to get a call tomorrow telling you you’re undercapitalized and 
that you won’t be able to raise money in the private markets.” 
Id. at 525. 




the government.  For regular, private controlling shareholders, the conflicts 
of interests are predominantly financial.  Such conflicts arise in so-called 
self-dealing transactions—where the controlled entity deals either directly 
with the controlling shareholders or with another entity in which the control-
ling shareholder has an interest—or in conflicts transactions—where the 
controlling shareholder stands to receive some financial benefit that is not 
proportionally shared with the minority shareholders.  Self-dealing 
transactions and conflicts transactions (if the conflict is material) are subject 
to review for their entire fairness. 
The U.S. government and its various parts, however, have a wide 
variety of interests other than financial ones.  Indeed, the predominant worry 
when the government is the controlling shareholder will not be that the gov-
ernment wants to enrich itself financially at the expense of the minority 
shareholders but that the government will induce the corporation to pursue 
political or policy goals rather than maximize the corporation’s value for the 
proportionate benefit of all of its shareholders.  This greatly complicates the 
task of courts.  Self-dealing transactions and material-conflicts transactions 
are relatively easy to identify by objective standards.  By contrast, to deter-
mine whether a transaction serves the government’s political goals is much 
harder.  The government’s political goals are both amorphous and far-
reaching, so that a large number of transactions can plausibly be argued to 
serve these goals.  Unless all of these transactions are subjected to entire-
fairness review, the court would have to determine whether the goal is im-
portant enough and whether the transaction furthers it sufficiently to warrant 
stricter scrutiny.  Because neither of these factors is easily or objectively 
quantifiable, this is a difficult task. 
Finally, review of such conflicts is rendered more difficult because the 
government is not a unitary actor.  Private controlling shareholders, of 
course, are also not unitary actors when they are corporations.  But authority 
within corporations is hierarchical, so if one agent of the controlling 
shareholder corporation acts (i.e., asking the CEO or the board to take a 
certain action), her actions can fairly be attributed to the corporation under 
normal agency law principles.  If the government is the controlling 
shareholder, however, there are problems with such attribution.  Start with 
actions by members of the Executive Branch and assume that the controlling 
stake is held somewhere in the Treasury.  Should all actions by members of 
the Executive Branch be attributed to “the government,” only those actions 
originating in the Treasury, or only those originating from the office within 
the Department that holds the controlling stake (or anyone above it)?  What if 
a regulatory agency (within or without the Treasury) requests that the CEO 
take certain action?  What if that regulator “reminds” the CEO of the 
government’s interest as a shareholder? 
Issues are even more complicated if the request for an action originates 
in the Legislative Branch.  Members of Congress can clearly have substantial 




influence over the executives, and management of the controlled company is 
well aware of that.  When influential members of Congress request that ex-
ecutives of a controlled company take particular actions, the requests will 
carry special weight because the government is a controlling shareholder.  
Yet, it is unclear how these requests ought to be treated for purposes of 
Delaware law. 
Cutting in the other direction, government interference is likely to have 
different goals than will the classic, overreaching private shareholder who 
seeks private gain.  When the government interferes, it will typically be in 
order to further some conception of the public interest or to reward a favored 
actor.  In either case, it is not directly lining its own pocket.  As we will dis-
cuss below, these differences make the fit with Delaware doctrine 
particularly awkward. 
C. Introduction: The Delaware Corporate Law Structure 
Return to our original hypo: the government, the controlling shareholder 
of DMAC with 56% of the votes, leans on DMAC to lend to DM and its 
dealers and customers on preferential terms in order to benefit DM with a 
potential cost to DMAC shareholders.  Moreover, the Treasury, with 60% of 
the votes, leans on DM to make its product line more environmentally 
friendly. 
To understand the distinctive challenges posed by government 
ownership, we first review the analysis when it involves only private parties.  
Under current Delaware law, the hypo poses obvious duty-of-loyalty and 
potential duty-of-care problems.  Under the duty of loyalty, the controlling 
shareholder faces a conflict of interest between its interests in DMAC and its 
interests in a separate corporation, DM.  The key questions under the duty of 
care are whether the controlling shareholder, in forcing DM to change its 
product mix, has breached any duty and, if so, whether the controlling share-
holder has been or could have been exculpated or indemnified against 
damages. 
1. The Duty-of-Loyalty Claim.—The treatment of this sort of conflict is 
well developed under Delaware corporate law.  A shareholder of DMAC 
would bring a derivative action in Delaware Chancery Court on behalf of 
DMAC against the controlling shareholder (assuming that the controlling 
shareholder had enough contacts with Delaware to support personal 
jurisdiction), the controlling shareholders’ designees/employees on the board 
of directors, and, for good measure, the other directors as well, alleging 
breach of the duty of loyalty. 
As in any derivative suit, demand on the board is required unless it 
would be excused as futile.  In this case, demand would probably be excused.  




Ordinarily, Delaware courts apply the so-called Aronson108 test to determine 
demand futility.  Under Aronson, a derivative plaintiff must allege specific 
facts that create a reasonable doubt as to (1) whether a majority of the board 
is disinterested or independent, or (2) whether the challenged transaction was 
the product of the board’s valid exercise of business judgment.109  When 
there is a private controlling shareholder, demand will often be excused un-
der the first prong because directors either have an interest in the transaction 
or have other business relationships with the controlling shareholder.110  If 
the self-dealing transaction involving a controlling shareholder is substan-
tively analyzed under the entire-fairness test—and thus not protected by the 
business-judgment rule—there is a good argument that demand is excused 
under the second prong of Aronson.111 
If demand were excused, the court would independently evaluate both 
the financial terms of the transaction and the process leading up to the trans-
action to determine if both comply with the entire-fairness standard.  In short, 
if the transaction were unfair, there is a significant likelihood that the plain-
tiffs would succeed in either enjoining the transaction or recovering damages.  
The robust protections provided by the duty of loyalty are a function of rela-
tively clear rules enforced by private injunctive and damages actions. 
This is not a hard case under Delaware law.  With its long-standing 
focus on controlling self-dealing by interested directors and controlling 
shareholders, Delaware has encountered and analyzed a dizzying range of 
variations on this basic fact pattern and has developed an intricate set of doc-
trines that discourage and deter interested fiduciaries from exploiting their 
control for nonfirm purposes.  In the private context, when, as here, the con-
trolling shareholder has, by hypothesis, directly interfered in order to force a 
transaction with a related party on preferential terms and without any inde-
pendent negotiating structures or noncontrolling shareholder approval, the 
liability of the controlling shareholder is so clear that one rarely encounters 
such behavior. 
2. The Duty-of-Care Claim.—Let us assume that the DM shareholders 
turn out to be right that the Treasury’s insistence that new DM make its 
product mix much greener is a catastrophic business decision that costs DM 
 
108. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
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110. See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., No. 12339, 1994 WL 162613, at *4–5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 
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Edward Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder: Implications for Delaware, 35 
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billions of dollars.  Moreover, let us assume that, in retrospect, the decision 
was grossly negligent by any measure: there were no market tests to support 
the prediction that American consumers would buy such cars from DM; the 
controlling shareholder had no expertise and no experts with regard to either 
the development, engineering, manufacturing, or marketing of automobiles—
much less green automobiles; and the decision was rushed through with little 
deliberation and over the (muted) opposition of long-time executives and 
directors.  The shareholders would now like to sue.  Do they have a decent 
claim under existing Delaware law? 
This part of the hypo is obviously designed to raise a straightforward 
duty-of-care question.  There are four parts of the analysis: first, whether the 
controlling shareholder in the hypo owes a duty of care; second, whether the 
shareholder’s actions violate the duty of care; third, whether any liability for 
a violation has been exculpated or otherwise immunized; and fourth, even if 
it has, whether injunctive relief is available.112 
On the first point, Delaware law is clear that when a controlling 
shareholder exercises control over business decisions, the shareholder takes 
on the same duties of care that other fiduciaries have.113 
As to the duty-of-care analysis itself, as recent cases from Delaware 
confirm, Smith v. Van Gorkom114 still provides the standard for liability under 
the duty of care: gross negligence.115  The hypo paints the unrealistic situa-
tion in which the decision-making process is grossly negligent (if, as stated 
above, the negligence is not gross enough, modify it however you wish). 
This then moves us to the third issue, namely, whether this conduct 
could be exculpated under section 102(b)(7).116  Although current Delaware 
case law wrestles with identifying the border between gross negligence 
(which can be exculpated) and bad faith (which cannot),117 the hypo can be 
decided on a simpler basis: section 102(b)(7) does not apply to a controlling 
shareholder.  By its terms, it only permits exculpation of directors.118 
 
112. As the suit would be derivative, the preceding discussion on whether demand would be 
excused applies. 
113. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134, at *19 (Del. Ch. June 24, 
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117. Id. at 239–42. 
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A more interesting issue is posed if we assume that the controlling 
shareholder is indemnified by DMAC.119  Under Delaware law, two prob-
lems stand in the way of such indemnification.  First, under section 145, 
indemnification is only permitted for a person who is sued “by reason of the 
fact that the person is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the 
corporation.”120  In our hypo, it is not obvious that the controlling share-
holder is an agent of the corporation and, by design, is not a director, officer, 
or employee.  Second, indemnification is limited to situations in which the 
person “acted in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably believed 
to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation.”121  This latter 
analysis poses some of the same questions regarding the line between gross 
negligence and bad faith that have been featured in the Delaware case law on 
section 102(b)(7).122 
Finally, even if the controlling shareholder is somehow indemnified 
against liability, injunctive relief against grossly negligent conduct is still 
available, at least in principle.  Although there are no recent examples of in-
junctions granted in remotely similar situations,123 the courts have shown a 
willingness to enjoin what are, in essence, duty-of-care violations in the 
mergers-and-acquisitions context, as, for instance, when a transaction is 
enjoined because directors have not complied with their Revlon duties, even 
if the same conduct will not be considered bad faith for purposes of 
exculpation.124 
3. The Duty-of-Good-Faith Claim.—The request by the Treasury that 
DM not close factories in certain states that are deemed important either to 
national economic policy or to the President’s reelection is hardest to cate-
gorize under Delaware law.  One could argue that the Treasury is subject to a 
material conflict of interest, albeit not a financial one, and thus has the bur-
 
119. If new DM goes bankrupt again because of its switch to green cars, the indemnification—
even if permitted—will not be of any use. 
120. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a). 
121. Id. 
122. See, e.g., Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 240 (discussing the “range of conduct” that encompasses 
bad faith and gross negligence). 
123. For an example in which a court refused to enjoin a fairly transparently foolish business 
decision, see Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
124. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001) (noting that a 
section 102(b)(7) waiver “would not affect injunctive proceedings based on gross negligence”); 
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 35–37, 56–58 (Del. 1994) 
(affirming a preliminary injunction granted for the breach of so-called Revlon duties); Leslie v. 
Telephonics Office Techs., Inc., 1993 WL 547188, at *9 (Del. Ch. 1993) (“[T]o the extent plaintiffs 
seek equitable relief for any alleged breaches of the duty of care, . . . [a section 102(b)(7) waiver] 
would not bar them.”); cf. E. Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-
Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399, 403 (1987) 
(arguing that, in spite of section 102(b)(7), the duty of care “will continue to be vitally important in 
injunction and rescission cases”). 




den of showing the entire fairness of the factory-closing policies it is 
pursuing.  While this is doctrinally cogent, we think that the better analytical 
category for this action can be found in the newly developed Delaware 
jurisprudence on bad faith.  Actions taken in bad faith are not protected by 
the business-judgment rule (nor insulated from liability under section 
102(b)(7)) and are a subcategory of breaches of the duty of loyalty. 
In the recent Delaware Supreme Court opinion Stone v. Ritter,125 the 
court elaborated on the concept of bad faith.  It explained that bad faith may 
be shown where 
[t]he fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of 
advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary 
acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the 
fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of known duty to act, 
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.126 
In our hypothetical, the request by the Treasury fits squarely into the 
first of these categories of bad faith, though in the real world, the facts will 
rarely be so clear. 
D. The Direct Challenge: The U.S. Treasury’s Obligations as Controlling 
Shareholder 
As this brief analysis of Delaware law suggests, a plaintiff could bring a 
plausible derivative suit alleging a breach of fiduciary duty against a private 
controlling shareholder in the facts set forth in the hypo, would stand an ex-
cellent chance of establishing that demand is excused, and would have a 
nontrivial chance of prevailing on the substantive claim. 
How does this change now that the controlling shareholder is the 
government?  The short answer: in more ways than you can begin to 
imagine!  Below, we explore those differences.  As we will explain, to sue 
the government, a private plaintiff would have to overcome the protections 
the government has granted itself under the heading of sovereign immunity 
and may not be able to proceed in the Delaware state court.127  Before we 
pursue this analysis, however, we want to stress that even in the “ideal” 
scenario in which a plaintiff could go to a Delaware court that would apply 
ordinary Delaware law, a suit against the U.S. government as controlling 
shareholder faces special problems. 
 
125. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
126. Id. at 369 (quoting In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)). 
127. For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the substantive and procedural law 
governing claims against the federal government, see GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (4th ed. 2006).  Much of the following discussion is indebted to Sisk’s 
analysis. 




1. Delaware Law and the U.S. Government.—Most lawsuits for 
breaches of fiduciary duty in a public Delaware corporation are brought in 
the Delaware Court of Chancery, a court that specializes in corporate law and 
has widely acknowledged expertise in dealing with such suits.  But even 
apart from the jurisdictional problems addressed below, the Delaware Court 
of Chancery is less than the ideal venue for pursuing fiduciary-duty claims 
against the U.S. government.  The state of Delaware derives substantial reve-
nues from its franchise tax (paid mostly by public corporations).  In 2010, 
Delaware received revenues of $633.1 million or about 20% of the state’s 
budget.128  Delaware is obviously keen on having these revenues flow into its 
coffers. 
Delaware is able to charge corporations significant franchise fees 
because its corporate law and the quality of its judiciary are considered 
superior to the law and the judiciary of other states.  However, as Mark Roe 
has forcefully pointed out, Delaware’s franchise-tax business lives by the 
grace of the federal government.129  Congress could, in one fell swoop, wipe 
out this business by federalizing corporate law.  Congress, of course, has not 
done so and, as we have argued, is unlikely to do so under ordinary political 
circumstances.130  This being said, Delaware clearly has an incentive to avoid 
annoying the U.S. government or even to avoid action that may annoy the 
U.S. government. 
The members of Delaware’s judiciary are usually former lawyers or 
government officials who are well aware of the state’s interest.  Thus, one 
may wonder whether the Delaware court, consciously or subconsciously, 
may deal with suits against the U.S. government for breaches of fiduciary 
duty less strictly than with equivalent suits against private parties.  When the 
law or the facts are unclear, there will be an inherent temptation not to pick a 
fight with someone who can cut off so much of your funding.  Accordingly, 
even if a plaintiff could bring a lawsuit against the U.S. government in the 
Delaware state court, she may be well-advised to seek a different forum. 
In addition, Delaware doctrinal law is—at least at present—not well 
equipped to handle the kind of conflicts that would arise when the govern-
ment is the controlling shareholder.  This is illustrated by our hypothetical 
request to avoid factory closures in states that are politically important for the 
government, either because of public policy or partisan political 
 
128. DEL. DEP’T OF FIN., DELAWARE FISCAL NOTEBOOK 29 (2010), available at 
http://finance.delaware.gov/publications/fiscal_notebook_10/fiscal_notebook_10.pdf. 
129. See Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 600–07 (2004) 
(explaining that federal legislation could easily displace Delaware corporate law and that the mere 
fear of this possibility influences Delaware lawmakers to avoid provoking federal authorities). 
130. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate 
Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2005) (“We argue that the possibility of federal preemption 
constitutes a threat to Delaware, but this threat is significant only in times . . . when systemic change 
is seen as generating a significant populist payoff.”). 




considerations.  When the government, as controlling shareholder, interferes 
in business decisions, many conflicts of interest will be based on political 
interests—such as in this hypothetical—rather than financial—such as in the 
hypothetical of the loan by DMAC. 
But it is hard for judges, including Delaware’s, to evaluate such political 
interference.  Virtually any action taken by the government has some plausi-
ble political motive.  How does a judge evaluate the materiality of conflicts 
when the conflict is nonfinancial?  Should the judge determine the impor-
tance of the political motive on its own or in relation to nonpolitical motives?  
And important to whom?  The Secretary of the Treasury, the President, or the 
President’s chief pollster?  What evidence can be adduced?  Can all govern-
ment officials be deposed and internal records be requested?  It is clear that 
problems abound. 
As a result, even if the government were treated doctrinally like any 
other controlling shareholder, governmental control of companies with mi-
nority shareholders would raise special problems.  But as discussed below, 
the government is treated rather differently.  This, alas, magnifies the 
problems.  As we have argued elsewhere, because Delaware is bound to lose 
any confrontation with Washington, it is well-advised to avoid such fights, 
preferably through reliance on discretion within procedural rules rather than 
through a distortion of its corporate law doctrine.131 
2. Sovereign Immunity and Its Limits: Claims Against the U.S. 
Government.—The starting point for any analysis involving suits against 
government entities is the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which holds that 
the U.S. government cannot be sued except insofar as it has waived its 
immunity.132  Through various statutes, the U.S. government has waived 
much of its immunity, but not all, and always with limitations. 
Moreover, because of the general immunity, any waivers are narrowly 
construed and burdened with conditions.  The principal waivers of sovereign 
immunity are contained within the FTCA, which, broadly speaking, permits 
suits against the United States for tortious acts by its agents;133 the Tucker 
Act, which permits claims against the United States for damages not involv-
 
131. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 63, at 756 (commenting favorably on Delaware Vice 
Chancellor Parsons’s decision to allow a New York court to decide a question of Delaware law in 
order to avoid a dilemma that pitted state precedent against prudent public policy); Kahan & Rock, 
supra note 130, at 1621 (“If Delaware is not able to regulate certain conduct effectively, it is 
probably in its interest to have this conduct regulated on the federal level (or by other states) to fill 
the lacunae in its own law.”); Kahan & Rock, supra note 111, at 410 (urging Delaware to “duck” 
confrontations with Washington and providing suggestions on how to do so). 
132. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (“The United States, as 
sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . .”); 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3654 (3d ed. 
1998) (“[T]he United States may not be sued without its consent.”). 
133. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006). 




ing tortious conduct (which includes, inter alia, contract claims and takings 
claims);134 and the APA, which permits actions against the United States for 
review of agency action seeking relief other than money damages.135  As we 
will discuss below, each of these frameworks complicates actions against the 
United States for acts that, under Delaware corporate law, could constitute 
breaches of the duty of loyalty or care. 
a. Jurisdiction and Venue: The Limitation of Delaware’s Role.—A 
key dimension of sovereign immunity that remains in force is choice of 
forum.  The United States has never waived its immunity to suit in state 
court.  Rather, under 28 U.S.C. § 1346, all suits against the United States 
must be brought either in federal district court or the Court of Federal 
Claims, depending on the cause of action.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, any 
claim against the United States filed in state court can be removed to federal 
district court.  Once in the federal system, who, if anyone, can plaintiffs sue 
and for what?  Here the real complexity begins.  In the following subsections, 
we will analyze potential claims under the three principal statutory headings: 
the FTCA, the Tucker Act, and the APA.136 
b. FTCA Claims. 
i. Is a Breach of Fiduciary Duty a “Tort”?—The 
FTCA waives sovereign immunity for “tort claims.”  The key substantive 
provision is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2674, which states that 
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title 
relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a 
private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for 
interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages. 
 
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006). 
135. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
136. These provisions cannot be avoided by suing government agents rather than the 
government.  The Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), fiction that a suit against a government 
agent is not a suit against the government was essentially eliminated by the provision for direct 
review of agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 702 (as we discuss further below).  This is complemented 
by the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 
Stat. 4563 (1988), which provides that 
Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting 
within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which 
the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a State 
court shall be removed without bond at any time before trial by the Attorney General to 
the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place 
in which the action or proceeding is pending.  Such action or proceeding shall be 
deemed to be an action or proceeding brought against the United States under the 
provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be 
substituted as the party defendant.  This certification of the Attorney General shall 
conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal. 
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2).  This Act is commonly known as the Westfall Act. 




The key jurisdictional provision is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), 
which decrees exclusive federal jurisdiction.  The first challenge, then, is 
determining whether breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims are “tort” claims.137  
This is a conceptually interesting and complex question that does not have a 
clear answer. 
As a historical matter, breach of fiduciary duty is not a tort.  It is an 
equitable rather than a legal claim and predates the sources of modern tort 
law, namely, trespass and trespass on the case.138 
As a conceptual matter, it is also pretty clear that breaches of fiduciary 
duties are not torts, at least not in the common law use of that term, although 
they may be “civil wrongs.”139  Indeed, if one carefully distinguishes between 
fiduciary duties and the duties of fiduciaries, one can identify core duties 
created by the fiduciary relationship that are, in fact, separate and apart from 
duties created by tort or contract law.  On the other hand, the conceptual ar-
gument may prove too much, at least for Delaware law: when one carefully 
defines fiduciary duty, many argue that the trustee’s or fiduciary’s duty of 
care is not, properly speaking, a fiduciary duty at all, although it may well be 
a duty that a fiduciary has.140 
 
137. Sovereign immunity to claims under the Securities Exchange Act has not been waived for 
two reasons.  First, under § 3(c), the U.S. Treasury is exempt from liability under § 10(b).  15 
U.S.C. § 78c(c) (2006).  Second, the FTCA explicitly exempts claims of misrepresentation or deceit 
from the waiver of sovereign immunity.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  This includes both negligent and 
intentional misrepresentations, as well as omissions of material fact.  McNeily v. United States, 6 
F.3d 343, 347 (5th Cir. 1993). 
138. Cf. Joshua Getzler, Rumford Market and the Genesis of Fiduciary Obligation (describing 
how fiduciary law was created in equity and stretches further back than originally expected and 
even precedes the law of trusteeship itself), in MAPPING THE LAW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PETER 
BIRKS 577, 596–97 (Andrew Burrows & Alan Rodger eds., 2006). 
139. See, e.g., Peter Birks, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISR. L. REV. 3, 3 (2000) 
(“Fiduciary obligations form a sub-set of those primary obligations the breach of which constitutes a 
civil wrong.”); P.D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES, AND TRUSTS 1, 24–25 
(T.G. Youdan ed., 1989); Sarah Worthington, Fiduciaries: When Is Self-Denial Obligatory? 58 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 500, 503 (1999) (“In short, fiduciary terminology should be used carefully and 
restrictively, so that fiduciary law operates only to exact loyalty; it does not concern itself with 
matters of contract, tort, unjust enrichment and other equitable obligations (such as breach of 
confidence).”); cf. R.P. Austin, Moulding the Content of Fiduciary Duties (“The fiduciary duties 
relate to improper profits and the avoidance of conflicts of interest, and we should no longer use 
fiduciary terminology to describe other duties to which fiduciaries and others may be subject.”), in 
A.J. OAKLEY, TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 153, 156 (1996).  Birks provides a 
different, although related, analysis of the content of the fiduciary obligation.  For Birks, fiduciary 
duty is derivative from the duty of the trustee of an express trust.  Birks, supra, at 3.  By contrast, 
Getzler suggests that the evidence equally supports the view that fiduciary duty predates, and forms 
an essential component of, the creation of express trusts and the duties of the trustee.  Getzler, supra 
note 138, at 577.  For a U.S. perspective with U.S. citations, see Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. 
Steele, Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 S.M.U. L. 
REV. 235, 235 (1994). 
140. See, e.g., Birks, supra note 139, at 5 (discussing how imprecise definitions of fiduciary 
obligations could cause the law governing fiduciary obligations to “duplicat[e] the work of the 




More recently, the issue of how to categorize a breach of fiduciary duty 
has arisen in connection with the question of whether a statute of limitations 
applies to breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims and, if so, which statute.  Older 
cases held that statutes of limitations do not apply in equity, which instead 
relies on the more flexible doctrine of laches.141  Over time, as the jurisdic-
tion of equity courts has expanded, as in Delaware, this distinction has 
broken down.  Under current Delaware law, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
looks to legal statutes of limitations as establishing a presumption for the ap-
plication of laches to equitable claims,142 although with a heavy dose of 
equity in its liberal rules for tolling. 
This evolution has forced courts to reach the question of which statute 
of limitations to apply or look to for guidance.  In some states, courts have 
applied the tort statute.143  Other courts have applied the statute of limitations 
for contracts.144  Finally, others, including Delaware, have applied a more 
general, catch-all limitation rule, even when a specific tort rule exists.145  
Statutes of limitations, then, provide an uncertain guide to whether breach-
of-fiduciary-duty claims are tort claims. 
But history, conceptual analysis, or analogous situations under state law 
cannot alone determine whether the use of the term tort in the FTCA was 
intended to include or should be read to include breaches of fiduciary duty.  
Rather, the question is whether the FTCA should, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, be viewed as waiving immunity for breaches of fiduciary duty.  
This question is linked to whether breach-of-fiduciary-duty cases can be 
 
ordinary law of tort” and referencing the leading case, Bristol & West Bldg. Soc’y v. Motthew, 
[1996] Ch. 1 (Eng.), against such “indefensible duplication”). 
141. See Kahn v. Seaboard Corp., 625 A.2d 269, 271–75 (Del. Ch. 1993) (providing a very 
perceptive discussion of the older cases pertaining to this doctrine). 
142. Albert v. Alex Brown Mgmt. Servs., No. Civ.A. 762-N, 2005 WL 1594085, at *12 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 26, 2005); see also Kahn, 625 A.2d at 275.  For a good discussion of the more general 
phenomenon, see Matthew G. Dore, Statutes of Limitation and Corporate Fiduciary Duty Claims: A 
Search for Middle Ground on the Rules/Standards Continuum, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 695, 720–41 
(1997). 
143. See, e.g., FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1310 (5th Cir. 1993) (addressing claims against 
the directors and officers of a failed bank that sounded in tort and were therefore governed by 
Texas’s two-year statute of limitations); Crosby v. Beam, 615 N.E.2d 294, 299–300 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1992) (holding that a minority stockholder’s claims against corporate directors, officers, and the 
corporate entity were governed by Ohio’s four-year tort statute of limitations). 
144. See, e.g., RTC v. Armbruster, 52 F.3d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that claims 
against the directors of a failed savings and loan were governed by Arkansas’s three-year limitations 
provision for contract actions); Bibo v. Jeffrey’s Rest., 770 P.2d 290, 295 (Alaska 1989) (addressing 
claims, against corporate directors, that were governed by Alaska’s six-year statute of limitations 
for contract actions). 
145. See, e.g., Kahn, 625 A.2d at 277 (applying a general three-year limitation period rather 
than the two-year period governing torts such as wrongful death, injury to personal property, and 
personal injuries).  More recently, Travis Laster and Michelle Morris have argued persuasively that, 
at least in terms of Delaware’s Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, breaches of fiduciary 
duty should be treated as “equitable torts.”  See J. Travis Laster & Michelle D. Morris, Breaches of 
Fiduciary Duty and the Delaware Uniform Contribution Act, 11 DEL. L. REV. 71 (2010). 




brought under the second major infringement on sovereign immunity, the 
Tucker Act, because the Tucker Act is explicitly complementary and 
nonoverlapping.146  Unfortunately, the legislative history of the FTCA seems 
to be entirely silent on the question, focusing instead on whether the govern-
ment should assume liability for automobile accidents: “With the expansion 
of governmental activities in recent years, it becomes especially important to 
grant to private individuals the right to sue the Government in respect to such 
torts as negligence in the operation of vehicles.”147 
The Indian Trust cases148—a line of cases that have been uniformly 
brought under the Tucker Act (which we will discuss later)—cast some light.  
In those cases, Native American tribes sued, alleging that the U.S. 
government had breached fiduciary duties owed to the Indian tribes in the 
stewardship of tribes’ land and natural resources.  Thus, for example, in 
United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II),149 members of the Quinault Tribe al-
leged that the U.S. government had breached its fiduciary duties to them by 
failing to manage their allotted lands properly, a claim the Supreme Court 
accepted.150  If, under Mitchell II, a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim can be 
brought under the Tucker Act, then it must be a claim for damages “not 
sounding in tort.”151 
Mitchell II, however, involved an explicit, federal statutory acceptance 
of a fiduciary relationship toward the tribe members.  It may be that it was 
the presence of this specific statute rather than the general nature of the claim 
that brought it under the Tucker Act.152  Indeed, there is some Tucker Act 
law that narrowly construes the Indian Trust cases and holds that generally 
claims of breaches of fiduciary duty, if they give rise to any claim, give rise 
to torts.153  Along these same lines, the Delaware Court of Chancery, 
interpreting and applying a Massachusetts statute that limited the liability of 
charities in tort actions, held that (at least under Massachusetts law) breach of 
 
146. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006) (“The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have 
jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States . . . for liquidated or 
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” (emphasis added)). 
147. H.R. REP. NO. 77-2245, at 7 (1942). 
148. See infra subsection III(D)(2)(c). 
149. 463 U.S. 206 (1983). 
150. Id. at 210–11. 
151. Id. at 212. 
152. Of course, that a state common-law-based breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim cannot be 
brought under the Tucker Act does not mean that it can be brought under the FTCA.  It could fall 
between two stools, always a possibility given the background of sovereign immunity and the 
narrow interpretation of any derogations.  See, e.g., Kashin v. Kent, 457 F.3d 1033, 1037, 1044 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (holding that a tort action against a federal employee involved in a car accident in Russia 
was barred by the FTCA’s foreign-country exception). 
153. See Am. Ins. Co. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 151, 158 (2004) (“For one thing, such 
general breaches of claimed fiduciary or equitable duties are ordinarily viewed as giving rise, if 
anything, to torts, the subject matter of which plainly is outside this court’s jurisdiction.”). 




fiduciary duty could be considered a tort for the purposes of the statute.154  
The question of how breach-of-fiduciary-duty actions fit within the federal 
waivers of sovereign immunity is thus uncertain. 
But suppose, arguendo, that a breach of the duty of loyalty will be 
viewed as a tort for the purposes of the FTCA.  Which state’s fiduciary law 
would apply?  Suppose that the plaintiff alleges that the responsible Treasury 
officials breached their fiduciary duties while in Detroit for a board meeting.  
According to § 1346(b)(1), whether the act or omission is a tort is determined 
by whether “a private person[] would be liable to the claimant in accordance 
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”155  This provi-
sion points to Michigan as the relevant state.  But, as a leading Supreme 
Court case points out, in determining the relevant law for the FTCA, you take 
into account the whole law of the state, including its choice-of-law rules.156  
Because Michigan, like most states, follows the “place of incorporation” 
doctrine in determining applicable corporate law157 and because DM and 
DMAC are both, by hypothesis, Delaware corporations, Delaware law would 
provide the rule of decision. 
ii. The “discretionary function” exception.—But a 
plaintiff is hardly home free.  Under § 2680(a), the FTCA does not apply to 
“[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal 
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion 
involved be abused.”158  This defense, known as the “discretionary function 
exception,” provides a very important limitation on the reach of the FTCA.  
Indeed, depending on how broadly it is interpreted, the exception could 
swallow the whole waiver of sovereign immunity. 
Assuming, as we do above, that the Treasury officials who make the 
decision to compel DMAC to lend to DM and its customers and dealers on 
preferential terms are employees (whether or not they are also directors), 
does the discretionary function exception apply? 
There is a fairly long line of Supreme Court cases interpreting this 
language in an attempt to draw a line between protecting public officials’ 
policy choices that have winners and losers, without also immunizing negli-
gent conduct that injures innocent bystanders.  Thus, in Dalehite v. United 
States,159 at issue was a conscious decision to cut corners in order to reduce 
 
154. Oliver v. Boston Univ., C.A. No. 16570-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14, at *9–11 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 28, 2005). 
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). 
156. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962). 
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 306, 309 (1971). 
158. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
159. 346 U.S. 15 (1953). 




costs in the manufacture of fertilizer to be shipped abroad, a decision that 
resulted in a cargo ship exploding in the harbor and causing damage.160  In 
holding that the decision was protected by the discretionary function 
exception, the Court drew a distinction between the “planning level,” which 
was protected by the exception, and the “operational level,” which was 
not.161  Later, in United States v. Varig Airlines,162 the Court rejected an 
FTCA claim for negligent certification of an aircraft and added that the 
purpose of the exception was to protect the government from judicial second-
guessing of legislative and administrative decisions that were grounded in 
economic and political policy.163  Even later, in Berkovitz v. United States,164 
the Court examined a claim that the FDA had negligently licensed a vaccine 
manufacturer and negligently approved the release of a particular batch of 
vaccine.165  The Court limited the exception to “discretionary” decisions—
where the decision involved was a matter of permissible choice for a 
government employee—and refused to apply it to mandatory decisions that 
must be made on the basis of objective criteria when there is no permissible 
discretion.166 
The Court once again tried to define the limits of the exception in its 
most recent effort, United States v. Gaubert,167 which emerged out of the 
Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s.  In Gaubert, the founder and largest 
shareholder of a savings and loan accused the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board (FHLBB) (the now-superseded agency then charged with regulating 
savings and loan associations) of negligence in its supervision of the savings 
and loan.  According to the shareholder, the FHLBB interfered in day-to-day 
operations of the savings and loan, pressured the savings and loan to merge, 
threatened to close it unless the managers and board resigned, influenced the 
selection of new management, and ultimately caused the savings and loan to 
fail. 
The Supreme Court rejected the claims and stated that “when 
established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute, 
regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a Government agent to exercise 
discretion, it must be presumed that the agent’s acts are grounded in policy 
when exercising that discretion.”168 
The Gaubert standard—criticized in the literature as too deferential in 
creating a perhaps irrebuttable presumption that discretion was exercised 
 
160. Id. at 22–23. 
161. Id. at 42. 
162. 467 U.S. 797 (1984). 
163. Id. at 814. 
164. 486 U.S. 531 (1988). 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 535–37. 
167. 499 U.S. 315 (1991). 
168. Id. at 324. 




when the decision was of a type that is susceptible to policy analysis, even 
when there is no evidence that the agent actually engaged in any such 
analysis169—provides the current boundaries of the exception.  Interestingly, 
for our purposes, it does so in a context that is at least superficially quite 
similar to the current state of affairs—efforts by government officials to work 
through a banking crisis. 
With respect to the duty-of-care claim, Gaubert would seem to provide 
a very strong defense.  In Gaubert, a founder and large shareholder of a 
savings and loan alleged that the FHLBB’s day-to-day second-guessing and 
interference caused the savings and loan to fail.  Nonetheless, the court held 
that the FHLBB was protected under the discretionary function exception.170  
Here, as there, one could argue, the exception would apply because, as 
Gaubert held, “it must be presumed that the agent’s acts are grounded in 
policy when exercising that discretion.”171  The decision to adopt a greener 
product mix is surely no less entitled to the discretionary function exception 
than interfering in the day-to-day operation of a savings and loan. 
On the other hand, Gaubert involved a governmental agency that used 
its discretion in the exercise of its regulatory function.  Whether the rationale 
of Gaubert and the other cases applies with equal force to governmental offi-
cials who act outside their regulatory purview—say Treasury officials with 
respect to the type of car to be produced and the location of factories to be 
closed—is unclear. 
iii. Are the actions in the hypo choices from “a range 
of permissible courses”?—The duty-of-loyalty claim is more complicated.  
Were the actions of the Treasury officials, in leaning on DMAC to lend to 
DM, its dealers, and its customers, pursuant to a regulation that allowed the 
exercise of discretion and policy judgment by the employee or agent?  How 
do the agents’ actions compare to those of the FHLBB in overseeing the 
failing savings and loan?  According to the Gaubert court, “day-to-day 
management of banking affairs, like the management of other businesses, 
regularly requires judgment as to which of a range of permissible courses is 
the wisest.  Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning 
level.”172 
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In our hypo, did the Treasury agents exercise judgment in choosing the 
wisest of a range of permissible options?  Here, we get to a very interesting 
feature of the government’s involvement in the automobile industry.  From a 
legal and regulatory perspective, that involvement has been ad hoc, even per-
haps haphazard.  As a result, the relevant statutory authority provides unclear 
guidance on what courses of action are permissible. 
When the EESA was enacted in October 2008, Congress was led to 
believe that the $700 billion would be used to buy up toxic assets, thereby 
freeing banks to lend again.  The original conception for the TARP program 
and the basis upon which it was presented to Congress173 was to give the 
Treasury authority and funding to purchase illiquid assets from troubled 
financial institutions. 
As noted above, the operative provisions of the statute reflect this 
understanding.  There is plenty of legislative history that is consistent with 
this reading.  Even worse, prior to launching the AIFP, the Treasury sought 
congressional approval of an automobile bailout and was sharply rebuffed.174  
As George Will has argued, in November 2008, Paulson specifically told a 
House committee, “‘I’ve said to you very clearly that I believe that the auto 
companies fall outside of [TARP’s] purpose.’  Then advocates of a Detroit 
bailout proposed legislation to authorize that.  It failed.”175 
As Will pointed out, and as the objectors in the Chrysler bailout 
argued,176 the creation of the AIFP to bail out car companies does not find 
much of a basis in the statute.  One can credibly argue that purchasing equity 
securities is permitted under the EESA, even though the original plan was to 
purchase asset-backed securities clogging up the banks’ balance sheets.  As 
discussed above, the statutory definition of troubled assets is quite broad, and 
equity securities could well be a “financial instrument that the Secretary, 
after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, determines the purchase of which is necessary to 
promote financial market stability.”177  But this power is limited to purchas-
ing troubled assets from “financial institutions,” and it takes extraordinarily 
creative statutory interpretation to find that automobile companies are finan-
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cial institutions lurking in the phrase “included but not limited to,” however 
troubled they may be. 
Not surprisingly, given the uncertain (or perhaps absent) statutory basis 
for the use of TARP funds for auto-company bailouts, EESA does not pro-
vide the same sort of comprehensive regulatory structure for the resolution or 
conservation of troubled automobile companies that is provided to bank reg-
ulators under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or the parallel statutes 
governing other banking agencies.  Given this lack, can the Treasury agents 
who decided to use DMAC funds to help out DM find protection in the 
discretionary function exception?  In the words of Gaubert, do the operative 
provisions of EESA provide agents of the Treasury with the sort of discretion 
that “regularly requires judgment as to which of a range of permissible 
courses is the wisest”?178 
As before, one can argue it either way.  On the one hand, because the 
Congress that enacted the EESA never thought that the money would be used 
to buy controlling equity stakes in private companies—neither controlling 
stakes in financial institutions such as AIG or GMAC nor controlling posi-
tions in automobile companies like GM—there is nothing in EESA that 
addresses how the Treasury is to manage its equity portfolio.  The closest 
that the EESA comes to a provision providing guidance is § 106, “Rights; 
Management; Sale of Troubled Assets; Revenues and Sale Proceeds”: 
(a) EXERCISE OF RIGHTS.—The Secretary may, at any time, 
exercise any rights received in connection with troubled assets 
purchased under this Act. 
(b) MANAGEMENT OF TROUBLED ASSETS.—The Secretary 
shall have authority to manage troubled assets purchased under this 
Act, including revenues and portfolio risks therefrom.179 
But, while § 106 authorizes the Secretary to manage the assets, it does 
not address how the Secretary is to address relations among portfolio compa-
nies and thus arguably does not provide guidance, even general guidance, to 
a Treasury agent in exercising discretion to achieve the goals. 
On the other hand, EESA does address conflicts of interest.  Section 
108, “Conflicts of Interest,” provides, 
(a) STANDARDS REQUIRED.—The Secretary shall issue 
regulations or guidelines necessary to address and manage or to 
prohibit conflicts of interest that may arise in connection with the 
administration and execution of the authorities provided under this 
Act, including— 
(1) conflicts arising in the selection or hiring of contractors or 
advisors, including asset managers; 
 
178. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991). 
179. EESA § 106(a)–(b), 122 Stat. at 3773 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5216(a)–(b)). 




(2) the purchase of troubled assets; 
(3) the management of the troubled assets held; 
(4) post-employment restrictions on employees; and 
(5) any other potential conflict of interest, as the Secretary deems 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest. 
(b) TIMING.—Regulations or guidelines required by this section shall 
be issued as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this 
Act.180 
On January 21, 2009, the Treasury issued an “interim rule” that 
addresses “conflicts that may arise during the selection of individuals or 
entities seeking a contract or financial agency agreement with the Treasury 
(retained entities), particularly those involved in the acquisition, valuation, 
management, and disposition of troubled assets.”181  In particular, the interim 
rules deal with conflicts of interest that individuals and firms who have been 
retained by the Treasury may face.  These rules are reasonably detailed and 
provide a fairly comprehensive structure for existing and future conflicts of 
interest faced by individuals or firms retained by the Treasury to work on 
TARP matters and impose a variety of restrictions on working for other firms 
with conflicting interests and on the use of confidential information.  By 
contrast, there is nothing at all in the interim rules that relates to the 
Treasury’s own potential conflicts of interest with respect to portfolio 
companies. 
On the other hand, TARP is a work in progress and this lacuna could be 
remedied easily enough.  Suppose additional rules were issued by the 
Secretary pursuant to EESA § 108 that granted Treasury agents managing 
TARP assets the same flexibility and open-ended discretion as provided for 
in the AIG Trust Agreement: 
[I]t is the FRBNY’s view that (x) maximizing the Company’s ability 
to honor its commitments to, and repay all amounts owed to, the 
FRBNY or the Treasury Department and (y) the Company being 
managed in a manner that will not disrupt financial market conditions, 
are both consistent with maximizing the value of the Trust Stock.182 
Assume, additionally, that the rules set the same standard of care, 
according to which the agent must “(i) act[] in good faith in a manner the 
[agent] reasonably believed to be . . . in or not opposed to the best interests of 
the Treasury and (ii) ha[ve] no reasonable cause to believe his or her conduct 
[is] unlawful.”183 
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Interestingly, of course, while these provisions would fill out the duties 
of the Treasury agents managing the Treasury portfolio, they do not provide 
clear guidance in our situation.  In particular, if using power over DMAC to 
benefit DM clearly violates the controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duties un-
der Delaware law, is the conduct “unlawful”?  And, if it is unlawful, does it 
fall outside the stipulated standard of care?  And, finally, if it falls outside the 
standard of care imposed on the Treasury agents, are the agents still entitled 
to the discretionary function exception? 
Consider one final variation.  Suppose that the Treasury rules were to 
state straightforwardly that Treasury agents, in managing the Treasury’s 
equity portfolio, are to respect the principles of corporate law and 
governance and to act with due care and loyalty.  Interestingly, if these were 
the marching orders, the defense under the discretionary function exception 
would be very strong.  After all, the implementation of the duties of care and 
loyalty under Delaware law is rife with discretion and fact-specific 
determinations.  The entire-fairness test is an ex post standard as opposed to 
an ex ante rule.  In its various formulations, it sets a broad standard (fairness 
of price and fairness of process), allocates burdens, and examines specific 
transactions. 
After working through the considerable complexity involved in 
challenging the Treasury’s hypothetical conduct under the FTCA, only two 
things are clear.  First, even with regard to a fairly clear violation of the duty 
of loyalty or care, success is hardly assured.  One can imagine a court com-
ing out either way.  Second, given the procedural and substantive 
complexities described above, one can hardly expect that an FTCA suit will 
provide the first line of defense against problematic conduct.  Put somewhat 
differently, if we are concerned that the government, using its controlling 
stake, will take actions driven by policy objectives that are not in the interests 
of the portfolio company, we probably should not depend on a breach-of-
fiduciary-duty action under the FTCA to protect against this possibility. 
c. Potential Tucker Act Fiduciary-Duty Claims.—We now turn to 
the Tucker Act, the second main waiver of sovereign immunity.  
Specifically, § 1491(a) provides, 
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to 
render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded 
either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation 
of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract 
with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in 
cases not sounding in tort.184 
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If a breach of fiduciary duty is not a tort for the purposes of the FTCA, 
can an action be brought under the Tucker Act in the United States Court of 
Federal Claims on the grounds that it is a claim for “liquidated or 
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort”?185 
Returning to the Indian Trust cases, we find the closest and most 
intriguing analogy.  Since the early 1980s, the Supreme Court has decided a 
number of cases in which Native American tribes have sued the United 
States for damages for improper management of tribal property including 
timber lands and coal resources.  In the leading case of Mitchell II, the Court 
traced the history of the U.S. role as custodian of tribal lands back into the 
19th century, finding that the relationship was not merely a “naked trust” 
established by the Allotment Act of 1887 to prevent alienation and did not 
impose fiduciary duties, as was held in Mitchell I,186 but rather through a va-
riety of subsequent statutes and regulations, established comprehensive 
federal control over the Native American lands.187  With this comprehensive 
control, the Court held, came fiduciary duties, duties that had been breached 
in the mismanagement of the timber resources.188  Similarly, when, pursuant 
to statute, the United States took full control of Fort Apache, used the Fort 
for the government’s own purposes, and neglected it, the Court held that, in 
doing so, the United States took on a trustee’s duty to preserve and maintain 
the trust corpus, a duty that it had breached.189 
But the Navajo coal-leasing cases make clear that the level of 
government involvement must be comprehensive.  In the first Navajo Nation 
case,190 the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of the Interior’s obligation 
to approve mineral leases did not impose fiduciary duties in doing so, at least 
when the tribe and the coal company had negotiated terms.191  When the 
Navajo Nation case returned to the Supreme Court after remand, the Court 
was even sharper in rejecting the claim: 
The Federal Government’s liability cannot be premised on control 
alone.  The text of the Indian Tucker Act makes clear that only claims 
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arising under “the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or 
Executive orders of the President” are cognizable (unless the claim 
could be brought by a non-Indian plaintiff under the ordinary Tucker 
Act). . . .  In Navajo I we reiterated that the analysis must begin with 
“specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory 
prescriptions.” . . .  If a plaintiff identifies such a prescription, and if 
that prescription bears the hallmarks of a “conventional fiduciary 
relationship,” . . . then trust principles (including any such principles 
premised on “control”) could play a role in “inferring that the trust 
obligation [is] enforceable by damages” . . . .  But that must be the 
second step of the analysis, not (as the Federal Circuit made it) the 
starting point.192 
Thus, though under the Indian Trust cases the United States can become 
a fiduciary and damages can be awarded for breaches of that duty, there is a 
high bar. 
Does exercising control through the power conveyed by a controlling 
equity stake cause the United States to take on the fiduciary duties of a con-
trolling shareholder, as under Delaware law?  The law is not clear.  Navajo 
Nation II, quoted above, holds that control alone is not enough.  Rather, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the duty must be based in the 
Constitution or a statutory enactment.  As the court held in Mitchell II, and 
subsequently reiterated in Navajo Nation II, quoted above: 
[T]he Tucker Act “‘does not create any substantive right enforceable 
against the United States for money damages.’” . . .  A substantive 
right must be found in some other source of law, such as “the 
Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an 
executive department.” . . .  Not every claim invoking the 
Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the 
Tucker Act.  The claim must be one for money damages against the 
United States, . . . and the claimant must demonstrate that the source 
of substantive law he relies upon “‘can fairly be interpreted as 
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage 
sustained.’”193 
In our hypo, there is hardly the same sort of comprehensive statutory 
framework present in Mitchell II.  Indeed, the only statutory basis seems to 
be the EESA, which provided the Treasury with authority to buy troubled 
assets in financial institutions.  Moreover, Mitchell II seems to suggest that 
the basis must be either the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute: because it 
is a waiver of federal sovereign immunity that is at stake, state statutes or 
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common law are an insufficient basis.194  The Treasury might therefore avoid 
Mitchell II and White Mountain Apache Tribe on the grounds that there is no 
adequate federal statutory basis on which to ground a claimed fiduciary duty. 
But that may be too quick.  The Indian Trust cases interpret the part of 
the Tucker Act that is explicitly limited to claims founded “upon the 
Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive 
department.”195  But the (regular) Tucker Act also waives immunity with 
respect to any claim “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of 
Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express 
or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated 
damages in cases not sounding in tort.”196  Can one argue that, under that 
final clause, the acquisition of shares of a Delaware corporation gives rise to 
liability for damages because, in acquiring shares, the United States acquires 
control by virtue of the network of statutory and common law provisions that 
are Delaware corporate law (e.g., the right to elect directors under 
sections 212, 216, etc.), power that brings with it fiduciary duties?  One 
might argue that this situation is much closer to Mitchell II and 
White Mountain Apache Tribe, in which the Supreme Court suggested that 
governmental fiduciary duties can arise when the government assumes con-
trol over property belonging to Indians.  Thus, in Mitchell II, the Court 
stated, 
Moreover, a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the 
Government assumes such elaborate control over forests and property 
belonging to Indians.  All of the necessary elements of a common-law 
trust are present: a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian 
allottees), and a trust corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds).  
“[W]here the Federal Government takes on or has control or 
supervision over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary relationship 
normally exists with respect to such monies or properties (unless 
Congress has provided otherwise) even though nothing is said 
expressly in the authorizing or underlying statute (or other 
fundamental document) about a trust fund, or a trust or fiduciary 
connection.”197 
Later, in White Mountain Apache Tribe, the Court sounded the same 
themes, allowing actual control to substitute for absent statutory language: 
As to the property subject to the Government’s actual use, then, the 
United States has not merely exercised daily supervision but has 
enjoyed daily occupation, and so has obtained control at least as 
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plenary as its authority over the timber in Mitchell II.  While it is true 
that the 1960 Act does not, like the statutes cited in that case, 
expressly subject the Government to duties of management and 
conservation, the fact that the property occupied by the United States 
is expressly subject to a trust supports a fair inference that an 
obligation to preserve the property improvements was incumbent on 
the United States as trustee.  This is so because elementary trust law, 
after all, confirms the commonsense assumption that a fiduciary 
actually administering trust property may not allow it to fall into ruin 
on his watch. “One of the fundamental common-law duties of a trustee 
is to preserve and maintain trust assets.” . . .  Given this duty on the 
part of the trustee to preserve corpus, “it naturally follows that the 
Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its fiduciary 
duties.”198 
In Navajo Nation II, the Supreme Court distinguished Mitchell II, 
without overruling it, on the grounds that in Mitchell II, there was 
a series of statutes and regulations that gave the Federal Government 
“full responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for the benefit 
of the Indians.” . . .  Title 25 U.S.C. § 406(a) permitted Indians to sell 
timber with the consent of the Secretary of the Interior, but directed 
the Secretary to base his decisions on “a consideration of the needs 
and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs” and enumerated 
specific factors to guide that decisionmaking.  We understood that 
statute—in combination with several other provisions and the 
applicable regulations—to create a fiduciary duty with respect to 
Indian timber.199 
Although one clearly cannot argue that there is a similarly 
comprehensive web of federal statutes that creates obligations on the federal 
government, one might argue that when the Treasury took a controlling in-
terest in DMAC pursuant to authority granted by the EESA and then 
exercised that control pursuant to the General Corporation Law of Delaware 
to benefit another firm in its portfolio at the expense of DMAC, it took on the 
fiduciary duties of a controlling shareholder under Delaware law, and “it 
naturally follows that the Government should be liable in damages for the 
breach of its fiduciary duties.”200  Indeed, while the case law seems clear that 
the common law of trusts (or of fiduciary duties) will not be sufficient to 
ground the Treasury’s obligation, the common law could be used to fill out 
the details of that obligation, especially, as here, when fiduciary duties are an 
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intrinsic part of the (nonfederal) statutory framework that creates the 
governmental power at issue. 
Although this seems to be a promising direction, such a claim would 
clearly be a step beyond current case law even if not precluded by the current 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.  It is, of course, unclear whether a federal 
court would choose to take that step, or whether if it did, it would be affirmed 
on appeal.  More to the point, fiduciary-duty law hardly provides any sort of 
robust protection that could plausibly substitute for Delaware’s fiduciary-
duty jurisprudence.  Again, we are driven to the view that if we are 
concerned about the government’s use of its controlling position, the Tucker 
Act theories are hardly reassuring.201 
d. Claims Under the APA.—A third basis for challenging the 
Treasury’s actions at DMAC is the APA.  Section 702 of the APA explicitly 
waives sovereign immunity for actions against the United States so long as 
those actions do not seek money damages:202 
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a 
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.  An action in a 
court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages 
and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof 
acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal 
authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the 
ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is 
an indispensable party.  The United States may be named as a 
defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree may be 
entered against the United States . . . .203 
Under the APA,204 actions can be brought in federal district court 
against the United States to 
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
found to be— 
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(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or 
immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or 
short of statutory right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to 
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the 
record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or 
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are 
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.205 
The question, then, is whether our plaintiff, a minority shareholder in 
DMAC, can bring an action under § 706 to enjoin the decision that requires 
DMAC to provide financing to GM and its dealers and its customers on 
preferential terms. 
Fitting the hypo into administrative law categories is not easy.  
Consider, first, a conceptually easier issue that arises out of the Treasury’s 
decision to invest TARP funds in Chrysler and GM.  As noted above, these 
investments raise two questions.  First, does a troubled auto company fall 
within the statutory definition of a “financial institution”?  Second, does eq-
uity in new GM or new Chrysler fall within the definition of “troubled 
asset”?  Both of these are questions of statutory interpretation and fit com-
fortably within the basic framework of administrative law.206  Under 
Chevron,207 the Treasury could certainly argue that Congress did not address 
the precise question at issue in the EESA, and, in any event, any congres-
sional intent was certainly not unambiguously clear.208  Given this and 
moving on to the classic second step of Chevron,209 the Treasury might argue 
that its interpretations of the definitions of “troubled asset” and “financial 
institution” were both “permissible” ones and thus deserve deference. 
But now contrast these typical questions of administrative law with our 
hypo in which the Treasury leans on DMAC to help DM.  Note, first, that the 
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action at issue is a rather different action than the decision to invest TARP 
funds in GM or Chrysler: it is not a normal exercise of agency authority.  The 
Treasury is acting in the private sector, not in government forums, and using 
its shareholding to do so.  It is not promulgating rules, nor distributing public 
funds, nor adjudicating matters. 
Consider whether Chevron deference will apply.  Here, the governing 
statute—in this case the EESA—offers no guidance for how the Treasury is 
to manage the portfolio.  Although the EESA is clear that the Treasury has 
power to manage the portfolio—and so managing it is hardly ultra vires—it 
provides no guidance, no standards, no criteria, and only the most general 
goals: 
SEC. 2. PURPOSES. 
The purposes of this Act are— 
(1) to immediately provide authority and facilities that the 
Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore liquidity and stability 
to the financial system of the United States; and 
(2) to ensure that such authority and such facilities are used in a 
manner that— 
(A) protects home values, college funds, retirement 
accounts, and life savings; 
(B) preserves home ownership and promotes jobs and 
economic growth; 
(C) maximizes overall returns to the taxpayers of the United 
States; and 
(D) provides public accountability for the exercise of such 
authority.210 
Moreover, although the EESA grants the Treasury the authority to 
exercise any rights associated with acquired assets and to manage the 
portfolio,211 no guidance is provided beyond the General Purpose Clause with 
regard to how and for what purpose.  And this is hardly accidental: it is 
crystal clear that when the EESA was debated and eventually enacted, 
Congress was not thinking about direct investments in equity, much less 
direct and controlling equity investments in auto companies. 
Further, in managing the assets, the Treasury has not explicitly 
interpreted the EESA or any other statute, so there is no agency interpretation 
of its own statute to which Chevron deference could apply.  While one could 
argue with regard to the investments in GM and Chrysler themselves that the 
Treasury’s act of investing can be understood to be an implicit interpretation 
of the statutory definitions, that same argument is much harder to make with 
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regard to the hypo because there is so little in the statute that pertains to the 
management of equity investments. 
Considered as a policy judgment, would the Treasury’s decision to lean 
on DMAC to help DM be invalid as “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law” in violation of 
§ 706(2)(A)?212  To the extent that this is another way of saying that agency 
action must be “reasonable,” it begs the question of the relevant standard of 
reasonableness.  Likewise, the final phrase—“or otherwise not in accordance 
with the law”—is suggestive without being clear on which laws it refers to. 
The hypo arises because the federal government acts in the private 
setting without explicitly taking on the obligations of that position (which 
would incorporate Delaware law norms) or explicitly opting out through 
preemptive legislation.  One approach to applying § 706 in this context 
would be to argue that, in corporate law as elsewhere, state law applies un-
less legitimately preempted by federal law, and thus, the Treasury is bound 
by the same state law limits as any other controlling shareholder.  To the 
extent, then, that the Treasury’s actions are inconsistent with Delaware 
corporate law—as they clearly would be—they are “not in accordance with 
law” and thus invalid under § 706. 
The counterargument, of course, draws on § 701(a)(2), which precludes 
judicial review when “agency action is committed to agency discretion by 
law.”213  As the Supreme Court held in the Overton Park case,214 the excep-
tion for action committed to agency discretion is a “very narrow 
exception. . . .  The legislative history of the APA indicates that it is applica-
ble in those rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that 
in a given case there is no law to apply.’”215  The “no law to apply” language 
can be understood as itself compelling evidence that a decision has been left 
to agency discretion or as merely one piece of whether a particular subject 
has been “committed to agency discretion.”216  In Heckler v. Chaney,217 the 
Supreme Court interpreted the provision as applying when “the statute is 
drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to 
judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”218 
Whether one gives wide or narrow effect to a statute containing “no law 
to apply,” it would not seem to provide a very strong argument in the context 
of the hypo.  While it is true that the EESA provides no guidance in how the 
Treasury is to exercise its rights as a holder of “troubled assets,” there is no 
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evidence that Congress expected the Treasury to acquire equity securities and 
thus no evidence at all that Congress committed the management of conflicts 
of interest created by control-equity positions to agency discretion. 
We see, yet again, how hard it is to insert the substance of corporate 
law’s fiduciary-duty analysis into a public law framework. 
e. Claims Under the Freedom of Information Act.—In yet another 
example of how everything changes when the government is the controlling 
shareholder, it is worth noting that the definition of “agency” for the 
purposes of the Freedom of Information Act219 (FOIA) includes a 
“[g]overnment controlled corporation.”220  Indeed, the effect of FOIA may go 
even further.  On President Obama’s first day in office, he issued a 
Memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act directing his incoming 
attorney general to reestablish a presumption in favor of disclosure of gov-
ernment records as well as ordering agencies to take “affirmative steps to 
make information public.  They should not wait for specific requests from the 
public.  All agencies should use modern technology to inform citizens about 
what is known and done by their Government.”221 
Take new GM, the successor to GM, of which the government still 
owns 26%.  What information can be secured pursuant to FOIA that is not 
already available under either SEC disclosure regulations or sections 219 and 
220 of Delaware General Corporation Law?222 
Particularly relevant for these purposes is the exclusion of “inter-agency 
or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law 
to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.”223  Although 
this limits the scope of material that can be secured under FOIA, it leaves 
undisturbed the advantages in timing: the FOIA will be most useful in gath-
ering information prior to filing a complaint.  Sections 219 and 220 of 
Delaware law are sharply limited in what can be secured,224 while the FOIA 
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exception provides support for a strong presumption in favor of being able to 
get all material that would be available by law to a party in litigation.225 
E. An Alternative Strategy: Leaving the U.S. Government Out of the Suit 
So far, we have assumed as inevitable that the lawsuit will end up either 
in federal district court or the Court of Federal Claims.  After the above 
analysis, one might conclude that trying to sue the federal government as a 
controlling shareholder is too hard to be worthwhile.  Is there an alternative 
approach that dispenses with the federal government that would allow the 
cause of action to remain in the Delaware Court of Chancery to be 
adjudicated under Delaware law? 
In a related article, we have argued that there are credible claims that 
could be brought against the directors under Delaware law.226  But this then 
raises subsequent and important questions: Should Delaware courts want 
such a case?  Should plaintiffs want to bring such a case in Delaware?  And, 
finally, how should Delaware avoid a case, should it decide that the case puts 
Delaware in an impossible position? 
In our related article, we argue that the plausible claims against the 
directors hold the potential to threaten Delaware’s place in the corporate law 
landscape.227  In such a case, the key questions would be (1) how the 
Treasury behaved, (2) would the case involve depositions of top Treasury 
officials, and (3) were a Delaware court to enjoin the transaction, would this 
risk provoking a confrontation with Washington?  In light of Delaware’s 
vulnerable position, plaintiffs would be wise to avoid a Delaware forum, and 
Delaware courts, were such a claim filed, should avoid adjudicating such 
claims if they can do so. 
How, then, might Delaware dodge the bullet?  We argue that Delaware 
Chancery Court Rule 19, the Delaware parallel to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 19, the “indispensable party” rule, provides sufficient discretion to 
avoid a confrontation.  By using the discretion provided by this rule of 
procedure, Delaware could “duck” the question without significantly 
compromising Delaware corporate law doctrine, the parties’ ability to resolve 
the dispute, or Delaware’s place in the corporate law landscape. 
F. Conclusion 
For a litigator, this is a pretty depressing Part.  The bottom line is that 
when the Treasury is the controlling shareholder, the legal basis for chal-
lenging conduct that would normally constitute a clear breach of the duty of 
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loyalty or care is very weak.  GM’s S-1 concisely and conclusorily takes an 
even more negative view when, after explaining that shareholders will not 
have any redress under the federal securities laws, it concludes, 
Further, any attempt to assert a claim against the UST or any of its 
officers, agents or employees alleging any other complaint, including 
as a result of any future action by the UST as a stockholder of the 
Company, would also likely be barred under sovereign immunity 
unless specifically permitted by act of Congress.228 
Although the claims against the directors or to enjoin the transaction are 
stronger, they put Delaware into a no-win situation, which Delaware would 
be well-advised to avoid.  It may be that a creative and courageous judge will 
manage within the confines of existing law to enjoin or sanction the conduct 
in the opening hypothetical, but when one compares the legal structure de-
scribed above to the robust protections of noncontrolling shareholders in the 
fully private context, there is not much room for optimism. 
For transactional lawyers, the reaction may be even stronger.  Even if 
the legal basis could be strengthened, this seems like a crazy way to handle 
the conflicts of interest created by government ownership of equity stakes in 
private companies.  Is there a better way to set things up so these impossible 
problems do not arise?  If there is not, then we ought to end the experiment 
as quickly as possible. 
IV. Structuring Government Ownership Ex Ante 
Government ownership is a political decision.  How involved should the 
state be in private industry?  To what extent should the government make 
day-to-day business decisions or set long-term strategy?  Is government 
ownership a long-term arrangement or a short-term fix?  For whom should a 
government-controlled firm be managed?  Among countries and over time, 
one observes a huge variation in attitudes toward, and structures of, 
government ownership. 
Implicit in the preceding Parts is the assumption that government use of 
its controlling interest in one portfolio company to aid another or to influence 
business strategy is problematic.  But that, of course, assumes a particular 
political choice about the appropriate role of government that is obviously 
contestable. 
The legal structure of government ownership—how the shares are held; 
whether ownership is complete, controlling, or minority; the role of courts; 
etc.—is important in a number of ways. 
First, it is part of the way in which political choices are implemented—
not the whole story, to be sure, but an important piece. 
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Second, the legal structure, which itself is a product of fundamental 
political choices, provides a window into what those choices have been. 
Third, existing legal “technology” sets a limit on political choices: we 
cannot choose what we cannot implement. 
In this Part, we examine a variety of contemporary examples of how 
government ownership has been structured.  In thinking through these ques-
tions of organizational design, there are a variety of dimensions—design 
choices, if you will—to keep in mind: 
 What is the goal of government ownership?  Profit?  Security?  
Preserving national champions?  Consumer welfare? 
 What is the term of governmental involvement?  Short term?  Long 
term?  Indefinite? 
 To what extent are firm decisions insulated from political influence? 
 How are decision makers held accountable?  Through political 
mechanisms?  Legal mechanisms?  Not at all? 
Given the historical variety of government involvement, a striking 
feature of the current arrangements is the widespread acceptance of a number 
of features, at least at the rhetorical level: first, that the goal of government 
involvement is to preserve or create firms that can thrive in competitive mar-
kets without continuing government support; second, that government 
involvement should be a short-term intervention that is justified by extraor-
dinary circumstances; and third, that business decisions should be insulated 
from government influence. 
Consider, in this regard, the Obama Administration’s articulated 
principles for managing ownership interests in private firms, including its 
then-61% ownership stake in the new GM: 
 “The government has no desire to own equity stakes in companies 
any longer than necessary, and will seek to dispose of its ownership 
interests as soon as practicable.” 
 “In exceptional cases where the U.S. government feels it is necessary 
to respond to a company’s request for substantial assistance, the 
government will reserve the right to set upfront conditions to protect 
taxpayers, promote financial stability and encourage growth.” 
 “After any up-front conditions are in place, the government will 
protect the taxpayers’ investment by managing its ownership stake in 
a hands-off, commercial manner.” 




 “As a common shareholder, the government will only vote on core 
governance issues, including the selection of a company’s board of 
directors and major corporate events or transactions.”229 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 
takes a similarly “liberal” approach.230 
Although one might doubt the sincerity of some of these utterances, the 
desire of the U.S. government to exit government ownership seems genuine.  
Substantial steps have been taken to reduce government ownership of 
Citigroup, GM, and AIG (although with the perverse effect of increasing it, 
at least temporarily, to 92.1%).  The articulated goals of the Obama 
Administration are a version of classic liberal political economy.  If we take 
this (perhaps merely rhetorical) consensus as given, the design analysis 
within these bounds becomes more tractable and more interesting.  The key 
questions become a matter of means: Which legal structures for government 
intervention are more likely to achieve the stipulated goals?  As we examine 
the different structures of government ownership, we will see a variety of 
approaches. 
A. U.S. Models 
In the extreme conditions of 2008 and 2009 with the ad hoc and rushed 
responses to the unfolding crisis described above, many of the U.S. 
Treasury’s investments in private corporations were made directly with no 
binding governance structure.  As a result, the U.S. Treasury directly holds 
the stakes in GM, Chrysler, GMAC, Citigroup, Fannie Mae, and Freddie 
Mac.  This direct-ownership regime, as we discussed earlier, exposed GM 
and Chrysler to direct lobbying by politicians over GM and Chrysler deci-
sions to close distribution facilities and dealerships in key congressional 
districts.  As such, “direct ownership” provides the problematic baseline 
against which alternative ownership structures should be measured. 
1. Chrysler 1.0.—The first Chrysler bailout was in late 1979 and early 
1980 and was structured as a debt-guarantee program rather than a direct in-
jection of capital.  Under the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 
1979,231 the U.S. government provided up to a maximum of $1.5 billion in 
loan guarantees.  The structure was somewhat different from what we ob-
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serve today, partially explained by the fact that although the country was in a 
recession, debt and equity markets were functioning.  The first Chrysler 
bailout had several important features. 
First, a Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Board was established, 
comprised of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chair of the Federal Reserve, 
and the Comptroller General, with the Secretaries of Labor and 
Transportation as ex officio, nonvoting members.232 
Second, the board had authority to provide loan guarantees “on such 
terms and conditions as it deemed appropriate” but only if the board 
determined that Chrysler had met a variety of conditions, including an 
energy-savings plan, a satisfactory operating plan, and a financing plan that 
would raise equivalent amounts of nonfederally guaranteed debt.233 
Loan guarantees could be issued under the Act only if the board 
determined that credit was not otherwise available on reasonable terms and 
that there was reasonable assurance that Chrysler would pay the money back.  
Chrysler was charged a guarantee fee (of not less than .5% per year), and the 
board was expected “to the maximum extent feasible [to] ensure that the 
Government is compensated for the risk assumed in making guarantees,” 
including “enter[ing] into contracts under which the Government, contingent 
upon the financial success of the Corporation, would participate in the gains 
of the Corporation or its security holders.”234  The U.S. government received 
14.4 million warrants to purchase Chrysler stock at $13 per share until 
1990.235  In 1983, the U.S. government auctioned these warrants, and 
Chrysler purchased them for $311 million.236 
Finally, a variety of creditor protective covenants were imposed, 
including veto rights over unapproved sales of assets, large contracts 
(including future collective-bargaining agreements), and a limitation on 
dividends.237  In addition, no guarantees could be issued after December 31, 
1983,238 and all guarantees expired and all loans had to be repaid before 
December 31, 1990.239 
The most striking difference between the first Chrysler bailout and the 
current bailout is the contrast between the debt model used in the 1970s and 
the private-equity model used this time around.  Although debt holders cer-
tainly are able to control firms in certain circumstances, the private-equity 
model typically puts control at its center.  In choosing the private-equity 
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model and relying on modifications of Simpson Thacher’s private-equity 
documents, the current intervention was tilted, from the outset, toward 
control. 
2. The AIG Structure: An Explicit Trust.—On September 16, 2008, the 
Federal Reserve rescued AIG by pledging $85 billion.240  As part of the 
package, stated in the Federal Reserve’s press release, “The U.S. government 
will receive a 79.9 percent equity interest in AIG and has the right to veto the 
payment of dividends to common and preferred shareholders.”241  On 
October 8, 2008, as AIG continued to spiral downward, the Federal Reserve 
pledged another $37.8 billion.242  On November 10, 2008, additional funds 
were invested through TARP.243 
The equity stake, noted in the initial press release, was not issued until 
March 2009.  When the stock was ultimately issued on March 4, 2009, as 
Series C Preferred Stock, it represented 77.9% of the voting power.244  It was 
issued to a trust established for the sole benefit of the Treasury. 
The terms of the stock issuance and the trust are both interesting.  As to 
the stock, Series C Preferred Stock, in addition to carrying 77.9% of the 
votes and an equivalent right to dividends, it also requires that “AIG and 
AIG’s Board of Directors are obligated to work in good faith with the Trust 
to ensure that AIG’s corporate governance arrangements are satisfactory to 
the Trust.”245 
The stock was issued to the “AIG Credit Facility Trust,” which was 
established by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY).  In the 
trust agreement, there is an explicit recognition of the potential conflicts of 
interests that can arise from the stock ownership: “WHEREAS, to avoid any 
possible conflict with its supervisory and monetary policy functions, the 
FRBNY does not intend to exercise any discretion or control over the voting 
and consent rights associated with the Trust Stock.”246 
In addition, there is also a recognition of the dangers of excessive 
interference: 
WHEREAS, the FRBNY anticipates that the Trustees will leave the 
day-to-day management of the Company to the persons charged with 
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such management, and will limit their involvement in the corporate 
governance of the Company to the exercise of the rights set forth in 
this Trust Agreement.247 
In the operative provisions of the Trust, the trustees, appointed by the 
FRBNY in consultation with the Treasury, are given the power to exercise all 
shareholder rights, including rights to vote on charter amendments, bylaw 
amendments, election of directors, removal of directors, and anything else.248  
Although given complete discretion, the FRBNY included provisions 
expressing its views on the proper goals of the Trust: 
In exercising their discretion hereunder with respect to the Trust 
Stock, the Trustees are advised that it is the FRBNY’s view that 
(x) maximizing the Company’s ability to honor its commitments to, 
and repay all amounts owed to, the FRBNY or the Treasury 
Department and (y) the Company being managed in a manner that will 
not disrupt financial market conditions, are both consistent with 
maximizing the value of the Trust Stock.249 
At the same time, there are a few restrictions built in.  The Trustees may 
not themselves serve as directors250 nor vote to elect as directors anyone who 
is or has recently been an employee of the FRBNY or the Treasury.251  The 
Trustees may not be officers or employees of the FRBNY, the Treasury, or 
AIG, or be the parent, spouse, or child of anyone who is.252 
The standard of care imposed on the trustees is extremely capacious: 
A Trustee shall have no liability hereunder for any action taken or 
refrained from or suffered by such Trustee, provided that such Trustee 
(i) acted in good faith in a manner the Trustee reasonably believed to 
be in accordance with the provisions of this Trust Agreement and in or 
not opposed to the best interests of the Treasury and (ii) had no 
reasonable cause to believe his or her conduct was unlawful . . . .253 
The initial and, at the time of this writing, only trustees of the AIG trust 
are Jill Considine, Chester Feldberg, and Douglas Foshee.254  Considine for-
merly was the Chair and CEO of the Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation and currently serves as a director of the Interpublic Group of 
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Companies and Ambac Financial Group Inc.255  Chester Feldberg was Chair 
of Barclays Americas from 2000 to 2008 after having been executive vice 
president in charge of bank supervision at the New York Federal Reserve.256  
Douglas Foshee is president and CEO of El Paso Corporation, a publicly held 
gas-pipeline company, and previously worked at Halliburton.257 
How well does this approach protect against the temptations identified 
above?  AIG, from the outset, has fought to run its business “on a 
commercial basis.”  The initial bonus scandal exposed it to political 
condemnation and forced changes in compensation policies prospectively.  
Indeed, compensation has been such a salient issue that the current CEO, 
Robert Benmosche, reportedly threatened to resign if he was not permitted to 
pay key employees market rates.258  The continuing involvement of Ken 
Feinberg, the compensation czar with authority over compensation in firms 
that have received TARP funding, complicated the management tasks and 
interfered with running the business “on a commercial basis,” at least if this 
refers to how non-TARP financial institutions are managed. 
As noted above, the trust is in the process of being dissolved, with the 
Treasury resuming direct ownership as a preliminary step to selling its 
shares. 
3. Another U.S. Model: Limited Voting and Predetermined Exit at 
Citigroup.—The Treasury owned as much as 34% of Citigroup as a result of 
exchanging the preferred stock it purchased with TARP funds for common 
stock.  As part of that exchange offer, the Treasury agreed to two interesting 
provisions.  First, it limited its voting rights slightly by agreeing to vote its 
shares in the same proportions as other common stockholders, except with 
respect to major decisions—including election or removal of directors, 
amendments to the charter, and any sale of the company.259  Second, the 
Treasury committed to disposing of the stock within ten years.260 
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How well has this worked out for the Treasury or for Citigroup?  It is 
hard to say.  Like other TARP banks, Citigroup sought to free itself from re-
strictions associated with government involvement (mainly, one thinks, those 
having to do with compensation) by paying back the TARP investments.261  
At the same time, the Treasury was keen to sell its shares so that it could 
show a profit on its TARP investments.  With the sale of the final block of 
Citigroup stock and the associated warrants at the end of 2010, the Treasury 
no longer has an equity stake.  The real concern should be whether Citigroup, 
to avoid the TARP restrictions on executive compensation, has repaid the 
TARP funds before it was strong enough to do so. 
B. U.K. Financial Investments Limited 
In the fall of 2008, as AIG, Lehman, and other U.S. financial 
institutions were collapsing, so too were major institutions in the United 
Kingdom.  With government investments or bailouts of, inter alia, Royal 
Bank of Scotland (RBS), Lloyds, Northern Rock, and Bradford & Bingley, 
the U.K. government found itself with significant and sometimes controlling 
equity stakes.  In response, U.K. Financial Investments Limited (UKFI) was 
set up on November 3, 2008, to manage those investments.262 
UKFI was set up as a company under the Companies Act with the U.K. 
Treasury as the sole shareholder.  A key stated goal of the structure was to 
adopt “[r]obust institutional arrangements for keeping UKFI at arm’s-length 
from Government, centred on the creation of a heavyweight UKFI board 
which will take all major decisions relating to UKFI’s business and its man-
agement of the investments.”263  The board included, as acting chair, Glen 
Moreno, who is chairman of Pearson plc, previously served as CEO of 
Fidelity International, and worked for Citigroup in a variety of senior 
positions.264  The CEO was John Kingman, who previously “was Second 
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, where he was responsible for oversight 
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and control of some £600 billion of public spending annually.”265  The re-
mainder of the board included an impressive group of directors with 
experience in business and government, a mix that was clearly intentional. 
The “Framework Document” established the relationship between the 
Treasury and UKFI and provided guidelines to UKFI in managing the port-
folio of Treasury shareholdings.  It opens with the Treasury’s overarching 
objective, namely, to dispose of the investments as soon as possible and, in 
the meantime, to preserve their value: 
The Company should, in compliance with the Investment Mandate 
described in Section 4, develop and execute an investment strategy for 
disposing of the Investments in an orderly and active way through 
sale, redemption, buy-back or other means within the context of an 
overarching objective of protecting and creating value for the taxpayer 
as shareholder, paying due regard to the maintenance of financial 
stability and to acting in a way that promotes competition.266 
It follows with a commitment by the Treasury to produce an 
“investment mandate” in consultation with the board, which the company is 
to comply with in managing the investments, taking into account the 
overarching objective.267  The board is then tasked with producing a business 
plan for the management of UKFI to recommend to the Treasury.268 
With regard to management of the portfolio companies, UKFI is 
expected to concern itself with corporate governance by working with boards 
“to strengthen their membership through the appointment of suitably 
qualified, independent non-executives.”269  The Framework Document also 
commits to preserve the independence of portfolio companies: 
The Company will manage the Investments on a commercial basis and 
will not intervene in day-to-day management decisions of the Investee 
Companies (including with respect to individual lending or 
remuneration decisions).  The Investee Companies will continue to be 
separate economic units with independent powers of decision and, in 
particular, will continue to have their own independent boards and 
management teams, determining their own strategies and commercial 
policies (including business plans and budgets).270 
With respect to wholly owned companies, the Framework Document 
expects UKFI to act like a private-equity firm.  With respect to partially 
owned public companies, it is expected to “engage actively . . . in accordance 
with best institutional shareholder practice,” including exercising voting 
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rights.271  To avoid any distortion of competition, UKFI will ensure that there 
are no interlocking directors among its portfolio companies and is expected 
to take steps to ensure that portfolio companies comply with codes of 
conduct, abide by insider-trading prohibitions, and, most intriguingly, 
“exercise its rights in relation to each Investee Company individually and 
will not co-ordinate its actions in relation to Investee Companies in a way 
that might distort competition between them.”272 
Immediately after the paragraph ensuring independence, the Framework 
Document commits UKFI to 
monitor and work to secure compliance with the following: (A)(i) the 
non-lending conditions attached to the accessing by RBS and Lloyds 
(including HBOS plc) of the Government’s bank recapitalisation fund 
and any other financial institutions accessing the fund and (ii) the 
conditions attaching to any decisions of the European Commission or 
national regulatory authorities in relation to state aid or merger control 
and any commitments given by HM Treasury in that context, as 
notified by HM Treasury to the Company (together, the 
“Recapitalisation Conditions”).273 
This section refers to obligations that these firms took on in agreeing to 
a bailout, “including maintaining, over the next three years, the availability 
and active marketing of competitively-priced lending to home owners and 
small businesses at 2007 levels.”274  Thus, for example, when the Treasury 
took 65% of the voting shares of Lloyds Banking Group in return for 
insuring £260 billion of the group’s toxic assets, Lloyds agreed “to lend at 
least £28bn over the next few years.”275 
The remainder of the document commits UKFI to establish corporate-
governance structures at portfolio companies that comport with “best 
practices” and expects UKFI itself to model these best practices. 
The Treasury retains a veto over any disposal or acquisition of 
investments, any variation in the terms of any agreements with portfolio 
companies, and any action that may prejudice the Treasury’s role as creditor.  
Finally, the Treasury has the “power of direction” and can give general or 
specific instructions at any time.  The board agrees to comply with such in-
structions or to resign.  Any such directions will be in writing and promptly 
published. 
In the time that UKFI has been up and running, it has already taken 
some firm public positions.  Thus, for example, it voted its 57.9% stake in 
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RBS against the resolution to approve RBS’s retrospective Remuneration 
Report because of the former board’s decision to treat two outgoing 
executives’ departures as retirements, thereby enabling the executives to take 
undiscounted and highly controversial pensions.276 
The UKFI Framework Document embraces what one might 
optimistically call “constructive ambiguity” or more pessimistically view as 
incoherence.  On the one hand, it adopts a model of “commercial” as distin-
guished from “political” management of the share portfolio and sets up a 
certain separation between the Treasury and the share portfolio.277  It 
seemingly adopts a goal of increasing the value of the portfolio companies in 
order to facilitate the prompt sale of the ownership stakes.  On the other 
hand, it leaves open numerous avenues of political influence, albeit with the 
potential safeguard of requiring that influence to be public, while also di-
recting UKFI to fulfill the mandate to lend.278  During a recessionary period, 
when lending opportunities decline, the two goals are in some tension. 
Put somewhat differently, the U.K. model relies on nonlegally 
enforceable norms as opposed to binding legal structures to provide 
insulation.  How well that will work will depend sensitively on the underly-
ing norms relating to government interference in business decisions.  The 
model, then, even if it works, can only be transplanted to systems with a 
similar set of norms. 
Indeed, the structure, based as it is on norms, does little to insulate 
“commercial” decisions in the management of the portfolio from political 
pressure.  The populist outcry over executive compensation provides a nice 
example.  Fred Goodwin and Johnny Cameron’s departures from RBS were 
highly controversial.  When Goodwin, the CEO of RBS, stepped down after 
RBS’s collapse, he received a pension of approximately £700,000 per year.279  
Although, by U.S. standards, this was hardly extreme, it generated a huge 
public outcry, in part because through manipulation of his departure date and 
other inputs to the pension determination, he received twice as much as he 
otherwise would have.280  Goodwin became a symbol of excess and greed, 
and his house was vandalized.281  UKFI then voted against the “Directors’ 
Remuneration Report” at the next annual meeting.282 
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Other examples are also revealing.  In the summer of 2009, the Treasury 
apparently pressured Lloyds, of which it owns 43%, to restructure a loan to 
JJB Sports, a U.K. health-club chain with 9,000 employees, rather than 
selling the debt to a U.S. restructuring firm, which apparently was willing to 
pay face value.283 
Later, when RBS, also controlled by the Treasury, announced that it was 
advising Kraft in its hostile bid for Cadbury and providing financing for the 
bid, severe pressure was brought to bear by two senior Labour politicians, 
Lord Mandelson, the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills 
and President of the Board of Trade, and Lord Myners, the Financial 
Services Secretary (or City Minister) in the Treasury, as well as by other 
members of parliament.284 
Political pressure, especially in the absence of binding legal restrictions, 
can be very persuasive. 
C. The Israeli Approach: The 1983 Bank Bailout 
In 1983, after a scheme by the major Israeli banks to manipulate the 
price of their shares collapsed and the banks were left holding huge blocks of 
their own shares, the government stepped in and assumed control of the 
banks.  This led to a period, now essentially ended, during which the Israeli 
government owned controlling positions in the major banks.285 
By 1983, at least with regard to the bank bailouts, Israel had accepted 
the “liberal consensus.”  To avoid government involvement in the day-to-day 
management of the banks and to facilitate the subsequent sale of the shares, 




282. In the United Kingdom, public companies must publish and submit an annual “Directors’ 
Remuneration Report” detailing the compensation of top executives for approval at the annual 
general meeting.  The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, 2002, S.I. 2002/1986, art. 3, ¶ 3 
(U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/1986/made (providing regulations 
made by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 257 of the Companies Act 1985).  A rejection has 
purely symbolic effect. 
283. Elizabeth Rigby, JJB Nearer to Fitness Club Sale, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2009, at 18; see 
also David Wighton, Hester Hits Out at Interference, TIMES (U.K.), Dec. 17, 2009, 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/columnists/article6959732.ece (discussing the JJB 
Sports deal and stating that Lloyds failed to take advantage of an “apparently attractive” offer by a 
U.S. restructuring firm). 
284. Jonathan Guthrie et al., MPs Aim to Block Financing of Bid for Cadbury, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 
15, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0e272be8-e9b5-11de-9f1f-00144feab49a,s01=1.html; see also 
Andrew Hill, Mandelson on Cadbury: Pure Politics, Impure Policy, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2009, 
at 15. 
285. For an overview of the bank-share scheme, see Asher Blass & Richard Grossman, 
Financial Fraud and Banking Stability: The Israeli Bank Crisis of 1983 and Trial of 1990, 16 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 461, 461–72 (1996), and Ehud Ofer, Glass-Steagall: The American Nightmare 
that Became the Israeli Dream, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 527, 559–63 (2003). 
286. Bank Shares Arrangement Law, 1438-1993, SH No. 2207 p. 378 (Isr.). 




each bank, a “public committee” and a “share committee” were created.  The 
members of the “public committee” were appointed by the government and 
charged with drawing up a list of candidates to serve as directors.287  The 
members of the public committee must, by statute, include a judge 
(appointed by the Justice Minister after consulting with the President of the 
Supreme Court) who serves as chair, with the other four members who must 
include an academic and a business person, chosen by the Treasury Minister 
with the agreement of the president of the Bank of Israel.  The members must 
meet the qualifications set forth for directors of government corporations and 
a variety of other competence and independence requirements.288 
The “share committee,” appointed by the public committee, is given 
both the power and responsibility to vote the shares for the State.289  The 
members of the share committee likewise must meet standards of 
competence and independence.290  The share committee nominates directors 
from the list of candidates prepared by the public committee and then votes 
for them at the annual meeting.291  A person cannot serve on more than one 
share committee; a director may not serve on more than one bank board.292  
On proposals to change fundamental corporate documents, the share com-
mittee is to exercise its own discretion, except that it is directed to vote 
against all proposals that directly or indirectly weaken the rights attached to 
the government shares or the ability to sell those shares.293 
When it comes to selling the shares, the Treasury Minister retains the 
power to order their sale and to approve any other plan to sell them, and the 
share committee is precluded from engaging in any share transaction except 
according to written instructions from the Treasury Minister or his agent and 
with the approval of the Knesset (parliament) Finance Committee.294 
The Israeli statute provides a very detailed structure designed to insulate 
the day-to-day management of the banks from political interference by 
giving share-voting decisions to the share committee.  At the same time, 
critical decisions—such as whether and when to sell the shares—are reserved 
for the political branches.  Moreover, the structure, with its multiple agents 
and reporting requirements, makes it nearly certain that significant attempts 
to breach the firewalls will be publicly disclosed and thereby trigger public 
comment and debate.  Finally, the Israeli structure provides a process for 
identifying and vetting director candidates that is independent from both the 
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banks themselves as well as from the political branches.  According to anec-
dotal reports, the system works quite well. 
Interestingly, Israel also has a separate “Government Corporations” 
statute that is designed for corporations in which the government owns more 
than 50%, with some provisions applying to “mixed corporations” (defined 
as corporations in which the government owns less than 50%).  The key fea-
tures of the statute include specific government approval rights over changes 
in the purposes of the corporation, its capital, and issuance of preferred stock 
or convertible bonds.295  The statute also contains provisions governing gov-
ernment directors serving on the board,296 provisions establishing a 
government corporation authority, provisions addressing subsidiaries and 
mixed corporations, as well as provisions governing privatization.297  A 
subsection addresses “defense of essential governmental interests.”298 
The best-known example of a government corporation is El Al Israel 
Airlines, which was bailed out by the government in the early 1980s and pri-
vatized beginning in 2003.  It has passed through each stage of government 
ownership.  The government currently holds no equity ownership aside from 
a “special state share.”299 
D. The Design Choices and the Background Politics 
Earlier, we pointed out that government ownership of equity can 
encourage political interference by providing the power to interfere, the 
regular opportunities to do so, and a low political cost.  Taking the liberal 
consensus as given, one can analyze the various design choices according to 
their capacity to block political interference by reducing the power to 
interfere, minimizing the opportunities to do so, and increasing the political 
cost.  The principal design choices seem to be 
 Equity v. debt 
 Voting v. nonvoting stock 
 Direct v. indirect ownership 
 Indefinite v. time-limited ownership. 
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Once one lays out the alternatives, the task of implementing the liberal 
consensus is actually quite straightforward: a legally binding structure that 
insulates the firm from political pressure coupled with a quick exit.  The fact 
that the available means are so rarely adopted suggests that, as a political 
matter, we may not in fact wish to implement the “liberal consensus,” even 
as we pay homage to it. 
1. Insulation Through Binding Separation.—Suppose one takes the 
liberal consensus at face value.  How would ownership be structured?  Here, 
we have at least two alternatives.  First, as with Chrysler 1.0, one could build 
the investment on the debt model and impose a relatively short time limit.  
Putting these together, one provides very substantial insulation from political 
pressure.  Debt provides far fewer opportunities for interference because debt 
holders do not typically vote for directors, on shareholder proposals, or to 
approve major transactions.  If one wishes to give the taxpayer a share in the 
upside, that is easily done with warrants, as in Chrysler 1.0 and TARP.  
These warrants provide no control rights until exercised and even then can be 
limited to nonvoting stock.  The public can benefit from increases in firm 
value either through exercising the warrants or, more typically, by selling the 
warrants back to the company or in an auction. 
An additional advantage of investing through debt rather than equity is 
that it prevents shareholders of insolvent firms from benefiting from gov-
ernment bailouts.  In the recent bailouts, why did the government limit its 
ownership to 79.9%, leaving 20.1% in the hands of existing shareholders?  
There are two explanations.  One is that government accounting rules, like 
GAAP, require the consolidation of accounts when the government owns 
80% or more.  Had the government acquired 100% of AIG, Fannie Mae, or 
Freddie Mac, their massive debts would have had to be included in the na-
tional debt and would have required legislation raising the permissible 
ceiling.  Because such legislation is always politically controversial,300 it was 
politically easier (although economically costly) to leave the existing share-
holders with 20%.  An alternative explanation is that capping government 
ownership at 79.9% was necessary to maintain the deductibility of interest 
payments to the Treasury (although why it would matter to the government 
that such payments would be deductible is unclear).301 
A second approach is to insulate firms from interference through a 
legally binding process for the appointment of directors and the voting of 
shares.  The Israeli bank-shares model, with two separate, independent 
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committees, provides an example of how this can be implemented.  Here, 
again, by limiting politicians’ power and their opportunities to interfere, one 
can provide for very substantial insulation.  For banks and other financial 
institutions with capital-adequacy requirements, government purchases of 
debt will not typically suffice.  In such cases, the Israeli bank-shares model 
provides an alternative structure of binding insulation. 
These approaches, when implemented properly, trump investments in 
nonvoting stock for two reasons.  First, nonvoting stock gives the 
(nongovernmental) holders of the voting shares the residual control rights.  
By creating a dual-class capital structure, one divides cash-flow rights from 
control rights, resulting in the well-known problems that such division can 
cause.302  Second, because nonvoting shares trade at a discount to voting 
shares, the government will get less when it ultimately sells its stake.  By 
contrast, government ownership of voting shares allows it to exit by selling 
the block either to a new controller or into the market. 
2. Mandating a Quick Exit.—In June 2009, Senate Bill 1280, the TARP 
Recipient Ownership Trust Act of 2009, was introduced in the Senate.303  
The proposed statute granted the Secretary of Treasury authority (and pro-
vided inducements to exercise that authority) to delegate the management of 
TARP positions of 20% or more to a management company run by three 
“independent trustees,” who are expected to hold and manage the assets “in 
trust on behalf of the United States taxpayers.”304  Under the proposed 
statute, the duties of the trust would be to exercise the voting rights and select 
the representation on the boards of TARP recipients with “the purpose of 
maximizing the profitability of the designated TARP recipient.”305  
Somewhat mysteriously, the proposed statute stated that the trust shall 
have a fiduciary duty to the American taxpayer for the maximization 
of the return on the investment of the taxpayer made under the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, in the same manner 
and to the same extent that any director of an issuer of securities has 
with respect to its shareholders under the securities laws and all 
applications of State law.306 
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Finally, the statute provided for the liquidation of the trust by the end of 
2011, unless the trustees believe “that liquidation would not maximize the 
profitability of the company and the return on investment to the taxpayer.”307 
The bill raised as many questions as it answers, but the general outlines 
are reasonably clear: a politically independent vehicle to hold and vote the 
shares, a 2011 sunset, and some vague instructions to manage the assets with 
an eye toward profitability and, by implication, without political motivations 
or goals.  The bill was referred to committee where it seems to have died. 
Binding time limits on government ownership are the single most 
powerful means of insulating firms from political pressure.  However 
troubling interference may be, a short time horizon minimizes the damage.  
On the other hand, while tempting, the obvious problem with mandating a 
sale is the trade-offs.  Exit cannot be so quick as to jeopardize the firms that 
we are trying to save.  Because we want to maximize the return to taxpayers, 
a forced sale will rarely maximize the price. 
V. Conclusion 
The preceding discussion shows that our current regulatory structure is 
ill adapted to government ownership of controlling stakes in private 
companies.  Delaware’s nuanced jurisprudence of fiduciary duty is not, and 
probably cannot be, duplicated or transplanted into the public law categories 
that come to the fore with public ownership. 
This gap raises two possibilities.  One might argue that because bailouts 
are inevitable, we should come up with a better system for holding govern-
mental controlling shareholders accountable for the effects of their actions on 
noncontrolling shareholders.  If one went in this direction, one might argue 
that Delaware corporate law should be incorporated by reference through 
some sort of inverse preemption.  Alternatively, in recognition of the differ-
ent incentives and goals of government controlling shareholders, one might 
argue for the development of a new set of standards better suited to the dis-
tinctive issues posed by government ownership of controlling stakes. 
An alternative view is that, given the difficulties inherent in government 
ownership, the last thing we should do is make it easier.  On this view, 
providing a better accountability system will only serve to encourage 
government intervention and further reduce whatever political taboos remain 
against it.  Because no regulatory structure can adequately control the politi-
cal forces at play, it may even be the case that we should preserve the 
current, ill-fitting system as is.  The worse the outcome, one might argue, the 
better for the long-term health of the body politic because there is no other 
way to reestablish the necessary taboos. 
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However one comes out on the direction forward, one thing is clear: we 
do not currently have adequate legal tools to address the problems posed 
when the government is the controlling shareholder. 
